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AGAINST SHAMING:                             
PRESERVING DIGNITY, DECENCY, AND A 
MORAL-EDUCATIVE MISSION IN 
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 
AMANDA HARMON COOLEY† 
“Nam ego illum periisse duco, cui quidem periit pudor.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Clayton County, Georgia, D.H., a twelve-year-old seventh 
grader, was suspected of possessing marijuana and was then 
subjected to an invasively shaming strip search.2  The school’s 
assistant principal conducted the strip search in the view of the 
school resource officer and three of D.H.’s peers.3  When stripped 
to his underwear, D.H. requested that the search continue in the 
restroom; this request was denied.4  A reviewing court 
determined that the school administrator then instructed D.H. to  
 
 
† Wayne Fisher Research Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law 
Houston. The author thanks South Texas for its research support and her colleagues 
for their valuable feedback. She also extends her gratitude to Lauren Kosches and 
Jasmine Plott for their research assistance. 
1 TITUS MACCIUS PLAUTUS, BACCHIDES act 3, sc. 3, line 80. 
2 See Dawson ex rel. D.H. v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 1306, 1308, 1312 
(11th Cir. 2016). In holding the search to be unconstitutionally excessive, the 
Eleventh Circuit emphasized its shaming nature: “We have no doubt that a fully 
nude strip search in the presence of one’s peers would exponentially intensify the 
‘embarrass[ment], fright[], and humiliati[on]’ a student experiences when 
undergoing a strip search.” Id. at 1317 (alteration in original) (quoting Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009)). 
3 See id. at 1311–12 (describing the witnesses to the strip search). 
4 See id. at 1312. 
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pull his underpants down to his ankles and stand completely 
nude while the search was completed.5  The search yielded no 
marijuana or other illegal contraband.6 
In Smithfield, Utah, a high school football player, Brian 
Seamons, was brutally assaulted by four of his teammates who 
bound him naked to a locker room towel rack with athletic tape 
and then displayed him to a former girlfriend.7  After reporting 
the hazing assault to school authorities and the police, Brian was 
informed by his coach that the assailants would not face any 
disciplinary action.8  Instead, Brian was disciplined by the coach, 
who told him that he would be required to apologize to the team 
for reporting the assault in order to continue to play football.9  
When Brian refused to comply with this shaming sanction, he 
was removed from the team.10 
On her third day at a Clay County, Florida high school, 
fifteen-year-old Miranda Larkin wore a skirt that was less than 
one inch shorter than the dress code permitted.11  Students who 
violate the dress code of that high school are provided three 
options: attending in-school suspension while wearing the 
noncompliant clothing, arranging for someone to bring them a 
new set of compliant clothes, or wearing the school’s dress code 
“shame suit.”12  Miranda maintains she was only given the last 
option.13  The school-mandated outfit was an ill-fitting, neon 
yellow T-shirt and a pair of scarlet red sweatpants, with the 
words “DRESS CODE VIOLATION” emblazoned across the chest 
 
5 See id. (making factual assumptions in the light most favorable to the 
student). 
6 Id. 
7 See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing the 
incident). 
8 Id. 
9 See id. at 1024. 
10 Id. 
11 See Gail Sullivan, New Kid at School Forced To Wear ‘Shame Suit’ for Dress 
Code Violation, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/05/new-kid-at-school-forced-to-wear-shame-suit-for-dress-
code-violation/?utm_term=.8843d9a98e53. 
12 See Eliza Murphy, Student Forced To Wear ‘Shame Suit’ for Dress Code 
Violation, ABC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/student-fo 
rced-wear-shame-suit-dress-code-violation/story?id=25252041. 
13 Id. 
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of the shirt and the leg of the pants.14  After changing into the 
outfit, Miranda broke out in hives.15  In reference to the 
punishment, Miranda claims “ ‘[t]he school . . . said this is to 
embarrass you’ . . . .  ‘It’s supposed to embarrass you so you don’t 
do it again.’ ”16 
In response to six-year-old Kai Shappley’s request to the 
Pearland Independent School District in Texas to use the girls’ 
restroom as a reflection of her gender identity, she was informed 
that she could only use the boys’ restroom or the nurse’s 
restroom.17  As a result of this “othering” via either mandated use 
of a restroom that did not reflect her gender identity or of a 
segregated restroom that other children did not use, Kai felt 
stigmatized.18  Subsequently, this shaming was intensified when 
Pearland Independent School District Superintendent Dr. John 
Kelly provided the following statement to the local newspaper 
that criticized Obama Administration guidance directives that 
Title IX generally requires schools to treat transgender students 
according to their gender identity: 
[T]his is one more example of unconstitutional interference and 
social engineering by the federal government . . . .  What’s next?  
Legalizing pedophilia and polygamy?  Unless we return to the 
Biblical basis on which our nation’s laws were established, we 




14 Sullivan, supra note 11 (describing the shame suit). The parallels between the 
shame suit and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter are obvious. See NATHANIEL 
HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 53 (Barnes & Noble Books 1993) (1892) (“On the 
breast of her gown, in fine red cloth, surrounded with an elaborate embroidery and 
fantastic flourishes of gold thread, appeared the letter A.”). 
15 See Sullivan, supra note 11. 
16 Madeline Roth, This Girl Was Forced To Wear a ‘Shame Suit’ on Her Third 
Day at a New School, MTV NEWS (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.mtv.com/news/192 
2772/miranda-larkin-shame-suit-dress-code-violation. 
17 See Emily McCombs, Christian, Conservative and Parenting a Transgender 
Child in Texas, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/entry/kimberly-and-kai-shappley-transgender-child-bathroom-
rights_us_58b5b5b6e4b060480e0c4393?39rg4x6r&. 
18 See id. 
19 Jim Molony, Districts Unfazed by ‘Bathroom Guidance,’ HOUS. CHRON. (May 
17, 2016, 3:53 AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pearland/news/article/Dist 
ricts-unfazed-by-bathroom-guidance-9770204.php. 
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Throughout America, public schoolchildren are being 
disciplined by shaming for alleged violations of school rules and 
community norms.20  These disciplinary measures penalize 
student conduct by degrading the student in an intentionally 
public way and by exposing the child to condemnation from the 
school community.21  School-shaming punishments include all 
forms of “scolding, rebuking, ridiculing, scorning, avoiding, and 
shunning . . . .”22  Specific examples of these shaming sanctions 
are strip searches, forced apologies, dress code violation 
punishments, and transgender student restroom access denials.23  
Despite their divergent forms, these shaming punishments share 
a common disintegrative variable: the stigmatization of the 
student by fellow students, teachers, and administrators.24 
Consequently, educational shaming is a burgeoning issue 
that requires scholarly and policy attention.25  While there has 
been an extensive amount of scholarly discourse regarding the 
propriety of shaming as a criminal sanction,26 there has been 
almost no critical discussion about the validity of shaming 
punishments as disciplinary measures in schools.27  This Article 
 
20 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1181, 1183 (2005) (discussing how norms are compelled through shaming); Amy L. 
Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. REV. 495, 500 
(1999) (same); Kerrin Wolf, Mary Kate Kalinich & Susan L. DeJarnatt, Charting 
School Discipline, 48 URB. LAW. 1, 40–41 (2016) (discussing examples of K-12 school-
shaming punishments). 
21 See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? 
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 2157, 2162–63 (2001) [hereinafter Markel, Shaming Punishments] (noting the 
public nature and public participation elements of shaming punishments). 
22 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and 
Intellectual Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
23 See, e.g., supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
24 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989) 
(defining disintegrative shaming as an intense condemnation of the punished that 
creates community division and a class of outcasts). 
25 See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain 
Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197, 266 
n.304 (2008) (noting how shaming is not uniquely a criminal law issue). 
26 See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 993–94 (2009) (discussing how an increased 
“recognition of the importance of social controls” has contributed to the expansive 
scholarly literature regarding criminal shaming). 
27 See Amanda Harmon Cooley, An Efficacy Examination and Constitutional 
Critique of School Shaming, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the 
paucity of legal scholarship on educational shaming). 
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is designed to initiate this needed dialogue by arguing for the 
cessation of school shaming through a legal theory lenses.  To 
accomplish this objective, Part I of this Article provides a 
definitional foundation of shaming punishments.28  Part II of the 
Article presents the normative rejection of school shaming, which 
is grounded in both legal punishment theory and educational 
theory.29  It provides a philosophical extrapolation of the rejection 
of shaming sanctions in the criminal law context to the education 
law context, highlighting the analytical division between the 
perspectives on criminal shaming held by Dan Kahan, Martha 
Nussbaum, Toni Massaro, Dan Markel, Stephen Garvey, Eric 
Posner, and James Whitman.30  That Part advocates for the 
termination of school shaming based on the tenets of dignity, 
decency, and moral-educative mission that have been at the core 
of critiques of shaming punishments in criminal law and that are 
central pedagogical goals and civic aims of the American K-12 
educational system.31  Finally, Part II concludes this argument 
by calling for a rejection of school-shaming punishments in order 
to make schools communities of respect, rather than communities 
of stigma.32  A liberal democratic society demands this 
preservation of dignity and decency be part of the moral-
educative mission of its public schools for children. 
I. A FOUNDATIONAL DEFINITION OF SHAMING 
All punishments express condemnation of a behavior 
through the imposition of a negative experience.33  However, 
state-sponsored shaming punishments are punishments that are 
targeted to humiliate and degrade the offender with a public, 
 
28 See infra Part I. 
29 See infra Part II.B. 
30 See infra Part II.C. 
31 See Christine N. Coughlin et al., See One, Do One, Teach One: Dissecting the 
Use of Medical Education’s Signature Pedagogy in the Law School Curriculum, 26 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 393–94 (2010) (arguing student shaming does not result in 
positive learning outcomes); Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1204 (2013) (discussing how shaming invokes equivalent 
moral and legal obligations). 
32 See infra Conclusion. 
33 See John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (2010) (outlining the communicative and experiential 
aspects of punishment). 
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expressive communication that the individual is inferior.34  
Consequently, shaming is inherently stigmatic.35  The term 
“stigma” originates from the Greek practice of cutting or burning 
symbols into the body, which was designed to expose the 
unsavory moral status of the inflicted individual.36  These rituals 
designated the individual as “polluted, to be avoided, especially 
in public places.”37  Erving Goffman analyzed this concept of 
stigma in the context of shaming as a sociological phenomenon 
that subordinates and dehumanizes people.38 
This shaming subordination of the punished individual often 
results in pariah status.39  As Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry 
detailed, “To be a pariah is to be shunned and isolated, to be 
treated as if one had a loathsome and contagious disease.”40  This 
idea that outcasts are inferior and that “contact with them is 
dangerous and degrading”41 dovetails with Professor Goffman’s 
perspective that stigmatized people are deemed to be and 
subsequently viewed as subhuman.42  State imposition of 
pariahdom and its resulting dehumanization of the shamed 
individual are “profoundly subversive of the ideas of equality and 





34 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2162–63 (defining the 
essential nature of shaming punishments). 
35 See David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, 
and the Right To Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1310 (connecting 
shaming and stigmatization). 
36 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED 
IDENTITY 1 (1963). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 See John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 
389, 409 (implying that non-restorative shaming results in stigmatization and 
pariah status). 
40 Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257, 266 (1996). 
41 Id. 
42 GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 5. 
43 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE 
LAW 232 (2004). 
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Despite its marked subversion of democratic ideals, shaming 
has deep roots in global and American history.44  Over the last 
thirty years, shaming has experienced a modern resurgence in 
the criminal law context as an alternative or a corollary 
punishment to fines and imprisonment for convicted criminal 
defendants.45 Analogously, many public schools now use shaming 
punishments as alternative or corollary punishments to corporal 
or exclusionary punishments.46 School shaming has become 
increasingly punitive, which is reflective of a recent, “massive 
and troubling intensification of American punitiveness.”47 This 
disciplinary approach that injects the punitive constructs of 
criminal alternative sanctions into school environments is a 
malignancy that needs intense critical examination and, 
ultimately, excision in order to safeguard American 
schoolchildren and the core tenets of the American educational 
system. 
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL REJECTION OF SCHOOL SHAMING 
A philosophical critique of school shaming forms a solid 
foundation for the rejection of these sanctions in public schools.  
This rejection is premised upon an extrapolation of the law and 
theory rejection of shaming punishments in criminal law onto 
school law.48 This comparison utilizes the bases of dignity, 
decency, and a moral-educative mission as foundational shared 
criticisms of criminal shaming, as these core principles also 
 
44 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 
664 (discussing how shaming can be traced back to biblical times); Jonathan Turley, 
Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the 
Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735, 783 (1999) 
(noting how American colonists readily used shaming punishments); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional 
Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1977 (2001) (discussing historical and 
contemporaneous examples of state-imposed shaming). 
45 See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884–85 (1991) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame, Culture] (“The 
revival of [criminal] shaming springs from profound and widespread dissatisfaction 
with existing methods of punishment.”); James Q. Whitman, Making Happy 
Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2716 (2005) [hereinafter Whitman, Making 
Happy Punishers] (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 43). 
46 See, e.g., supra notes 1–24 and accompanying text (detailing a variety of 
school-shaming punishments). 
47 Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, supra note 45, at 2716–17. 
48 See infra Part II.A. 
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constitute focal points of the pedagogical goals and civic aims of 
education of children in American schools.49  Because school-
shaming punishments contradict these foundational tenets of 
dignity, decency, and an educative mission, analogical 
connections to shaming punishments imposed in the criminal 
justice system support a valid framework to attack the 
imposition of shaming of schoolchildren.50 The normative goals of 
this Article are to use this framework (1) to generate the type of 
robust dialogue that has been present in a philosophical rejection 
of criminal shaming punishments for educational shaming 
punishments and (2) to argue that the view of scholars who 
advocate for the cessation of criminal shaming punishments is 
the proper view in the education law context.  Consequently, this 
argument will conclude that disintegrative school-shaming 
punishments are not an appropriate tool for state discipline and 
control of schoolchildren.51 
A. The Extrapolation of Critical Analysis of Criminal Shaming 
to the Critical Analysis of School Shaming 
The parallels between state control in the criminal justice 
system and in K-12 schools justify an extrapolation of the 
rejection of shaming sanctions in criminal law to education law.52  
A foundational analogue between educational shaming 
punishments and criminal shaming punishments has been their 
development as an alternative to exclusionary and corporal 
punishments.53  The critical debate on shaming in criminal law 
 
49 See infra Part II.B. 
50 The application of such an analogical foundation is not without precedent in 
other areas of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate: 
Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1037 
(2016) (using the criminal shaming debate as a foundational framework to discuss 
shaming in cyberlaw). 
51 It is offered in a similar vein as Professor Dan Markel’s critiques of criminal 
shaming, as “a project in philosophy, law, and ultimately, social hope.” Markel, 
Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2241. 
52 See, e.g., Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (D. Or. 
2010) (discussing the “unique concerns of children and of the government, which 
have analogies in both prisons and schools . . . .”); Barbara Fedders, The Anti-
Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 569 (2016) (arguing school 
discipline “incorporates the retributive underpinnings of criminal law”). 
53 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Natural Law and Lawlessness: Modern Lessons 
from Pirates, Lepers, Eskimos, and Survivors, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 433, 486 
(discussing the imposition of shaming penalties as an alternative to incarceration); 
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was spurred by the pursuit for alternative or corollary 
punishments to incarceration,54 which excludes individuals from 
participation in free society.55  Likewise, the application of this 
philosophical debate to educational shaming punishments serves 
as the jumping-off point of evaluating the propriety of shaming 
punishments as alternative or corollary punishments to 
suspension or expulsion from school, which exclude students 
from the school community.56 
Additionally, the rejection of shaming in criminal law can be 
translated to a corresponding rejection of shaming in education 
law, because as a baseline, children in schools should not be 
subject to the types of shaming punishments inflicted by adult 
and institutional state actors on adult criminal offenders and 
incarcerated prisoners.57  The United States Supreme Court in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. stated that it was “not yet ready to hold 
that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment,” implying that students should have at 
least more rights than those of prisoners in the context of 
government searches.58  This notion aligns with other Supreme 
Court articulations that the risk of harm is greater for children 
than adults in settings of possible constitutional criminal 
 
Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1860 (2005) (articulating the 
view that criminal shaming is innovative compared to other forms of criminal 
punishment). 
54 See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization 
of Low-Income Women, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 297, 311 (2013) (discussing the “scholars 
who have argued that certain types of shaming might be more effective, more just, 
and less costly than incarceration”); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism 
in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1557 (2002) (discussing the alternatives—
including shaming—states have used instead of incarceration for criminal 
violations). 
55 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (“The 
prisoner’s . . . incarceration deprives [her or] him of the freedom ‘to be with family 
and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.’ ”) (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 
56 See supra notes 1–24 and accompanying text (detailing a variety of school-
shaming punishments). 
57 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 211 (noting that because “children are in 
general more labile than adults, . . . special care needs to be taken over the use of 
shame in their case”); Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 71, 105 (2010) (discussing the dangerous consequences of judicial 
equations of constitutional protections between schoolchildren and adults and 
advocating for the termination of such equations). 
58 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985). 
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procedure violations.59  Therefore, if the correct view of criminal 
shaming sanctions is that they are not appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms for adults in the criminal justice system, then that 
view is only magnified in supporting the end to their use on 
children in K-12 schools. 
B. The Philosophical Rejection of Shaming in Criminal Law 
In 1940, Columbia Law Professor Herbert Wechsler,60 who 
initiated and framed the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code,61 and his colleague Jerome Michael wrote in their 
influential criminal law casebook that “the desire for revenge, the 
belief that retributive punishment is just, and the feeling that 
examples must be made of those guilty of shocking crimes are to 
a very considerable degree entrenched in the general 
population.”62  The debate over the propriety of retribution’s role 
in American criminal law and theory has continued since the 
publication of the Michael-Wechsler book,63 which was one of the 
first to incorporate social values into legal practice.64  Due to 
increasing academic and political support of principles of  
 
 
59 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269, 273 (2011) (discussing 
how the risks of false confessions in custodial interrogations are “more troubling” 
and “more acute” for juvenile suspects as compared to adult suspects based on the 
differences in maturity and responsibility between children and adults). 
60 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1359, 1359 (2000) (discussing Professor Wechsler’s career). 
61 See George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 687, 688 (2000) (outlining the origins of the Model Penal Code). 
62 JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 16 (1940). 
63 See Sol Rubin, The Law Schools and the Law of Sentencing and Correctional 
Treatment, 43 TEX. L. REV. 332, 337–38 (1965) (discussing the groundbreaking 
nature of the casebook); see also Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert 
Wechsler, the Model Penal Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017, 
1018 (denoting criticism of the American Law Institute’s 2007 revisions regarding 
retribution). 
64 See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public 
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 245 (1943) 
(discussing the casebook’s paradigmatic nature with its explicit organization of 
social values as an application of legal practice). 
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retribution and an environment of popular punitiveness,65 there 
has been a renaissance of shaming punishments in criminal law, 
which has enlivened the debate in the contemporary context.66 
This spirited dialogue regarding the validity of criminal 
shaming punishments was largely initiated by Dan Kahan in his 
1996 article, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?67  In this 
article, Professor Kahan advocated for shaming in criminal law 
as a better alternative to exclusionary imprisonment,68 rejecting 
along the way the “barely conceivable” alternative of corporal 
punishment69 and emphasizing the necessity of connections of 
criminal punishments with social norms.70  Kahan’s seminal 
article endorses shaming punishments as they effectively 
“express appropriate moral condemnation,”71 they “denounce the 
wrongdoer and his [or her] conduct as contrary to shared moral 
norms,”72 and they “ritualistically separate the wrongdoer from 
those who subscribe to such norms.”73  However, Professor Kahan 
acknowledges the stigmatizing harm of shaming penalties,74 their 
cruel nature,75 and their potential to gain hierarchical meaning 
when focused on traditionally socially marginalized groups of 
people.76  Still, under his criminal punishment theory calculus, 
Kahan’s assessment concludes that shaming sanctions are a 
valid form of criminal discipline.77 
 
65 See Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and 
Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1188 (2006) 
(quoting Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity 
Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001)) (“Cruelty and pain, long treated as 
inappropriate ends of public policy, are steadily making inroads into the discourse 
and practice of punishment.”). 
66 See Deborah Ahrens, Note, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child 
Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 750 (2000) 
(discussing the resurgence of criminal shaming). 
67 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 
594 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]. 
68 See id. at 652 (identifying shaming penalties as a feasible alternative criminal 
sanction). 
69 Id. at 591. 
70 See id. at 593. 
71 Id. at 635. 
72 Id. at 636. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 638. 
75 See id. at 646. 
76 See id. at 647–48. 
77 See id. at 652. 
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Professor Kahan’s article set off a critical firestorm 
regarding the propriety of criminal shaming punishments.78  The 
critiques of criminal shaming draw from a diverse range of 
theoretical justifications.79  Broadly construed, these critiques 
can be situated in ideals of dignity, decency, and moral-educative 
mission.80  The lack of fulfillment of each of these ideals 
undercuts the legitimacy of the state’s use of shaming 
punishments for adult criminal offenders.81 
1. Dignity 
One major critique of criminal shaming punishments is that 
their inherent stigma menaces and eradicates individual 
dignity.82  Martha Nussbaum and Toni Massaro are leading 
opponents of criminal shaming based on the perspective that it is 
offensive to human dignity.83  Under Professor Nussbaum’s view, 
“law should protect the equal dignity of all citizens, both by 
devising ways in which those already stigmatized as different can 
enjoy lives of greater dignity and by refusing to make law a 
partner to the social infliction of shame.”84  However, as Toni 
Massaro argues, “[s]tate-enforced shaming authorizes public 
officials to search for and destroy or damage an offender’s 
dignity.”85  Professor Nussbaum emphasizes how shaming 
punishments degrade the civic democratic ideals of dignity and 
 
78 See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2075, 2079 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan, Shaming Sanctions] (admitting that his 
previous article “provoked a torrent of criticism”); Markel, Shaming Punishments, 
supra note 21, at 2162 (discussing the intense critical controversy regarding criminal 
shaming). 
79 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 4 (“Nor do opponents of shaming penalties 
agree about what the best rationale for opposition is.”). 
80 See infra Part II.B.1–3. 
81 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in 
America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1764–71 (1999) (discussing the lack of legitimacy of 
criminal shaming punishments on the bases of dignity, decency, and moral-
educative mission). 
82 See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733, 739 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Shaming Punishments] (discussing the 
menacing effect on dignity of criminal shaming punishments). 
83 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 230 (emphasizing the invalidity of 
criminal shaming due to dignitary concerns); Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 
45, at 1943 (rejecting criminal shaming because it offends human dignity). 
84 NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 174. 
85 Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1943. 
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equality86 and, echoing Professor Goffman,87 how this 
degradation results in the denigration of the shamed individual’s 
basic humanity.88 
Another dignity-based critique of criminal shaming 
concentrates on the harmful permanence of stripping away 
dignity.  For example, Professor Markel’s critical rejection of 
shaming punishments focuses on their significant reputational 
damage to individual dignity, likening them to “reputational 
homicide”89 and criticizing Professor Kahan’s advocacy of a 
“punishment that effectively ends the life of the offender by 
taking away all his [or her] dignity.”90  Also echoing Professor 
Goffman, Professor Markel’s definition of shaming punishments 
displays their inherently negative nature:  “When one shames 
another person, the goal is to degrade the object of shame, to 
place him [or her] lower in the chain of being, to dehumanize him 
[or her],”91 and “to express to the public that this offender is a bad 
person.”92  Professor Markel’s scholarship highlights how 
shaming punishments “make[] the offender an instrument of the 
state; [she or] he is being used (even if indirectly) for display 
purposes rather than being treated as someone possessing the 
basic dignity that attaches to a responsible moral agent.”93  
Professor Nussbaum also spends considerable time describing 
the harm of stigmatizing shaming punishments, which includes 
legal and civil disabilities, long-term individual collateral 
consequences, and the permanent pain from the loss of dignity 
that occurs intrinsically with shaming.94  In sum, these 
punishments destroy the potential for the punished individual to 
ever again be recognized as having basic human dignity.95 
 
86 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 226. 
87 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
88 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232. 
89 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220. 
90 Id. at 2174 n.84. 
91 Id. at 2179. 
92 Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections 
on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1385, 1390 n.25 (2007) [hereinafter Markel, Wrong Turns]. 
93 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2219. 
94 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 225. 
95 See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220 (emphasizing the 
permanence of dignitary harm with criminal shaming). 
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James Whitman, another opponent of shaming sanctions, 
focuses his critique of these punishments on the claim that they 
violate transactional or marketplace dignity, due to their reliance 
on the inherently unpredictable community to participate in the 
shaming process.96  Specifically, Professor Whitman argues that 
“[s]ubjecting offenders to the public’s unpredictable response to 
shame sanctions is a violation of our modern sense of what we 
might call transactional dignity.  It is a deeply rooted norm of our 
society that persons should never be forced to deal with wild or 
unpredictable partners.”97  This scholarship argues that 
harshness is a certain consequence of shaming sanctions, as they 
require privately-inflicted sanctions, which are per se violative of 
the punished individual’s dignity.98 
This quadrumvirate of legal scholars provides a deeply 
persuasive argument against the validity of criminal shaming 
punishments based on the claim that they are antithetical to the 
value of human dignity.  By highlighting the permanently 
deleterious impact of this loss of dignity on both an individual 
and transactional level, the dignitary opposition to criminal 
shaming sanctions argues that these punishments are violative 
of the true social norms of a civic democracy.  Consequently, this 
dignity critique of criminal shaming punishments strongly 
supports the termination of their use in the U.S. criminal justice 
system. 
2. Decency 
Criminal shaming punishments have also been criticized in 
terms of their lack of decency99—essentially, that a decent state 
should not inflict punishments that eradicate individual 
dignity100 and that shaming punishments fail “the litmus test of 
 
96 See James Q. Whitman, Essay, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1090 (1998) [hereinafter Whitman, Shame 
Sanctions]. 
97 Id. (emphasis in original). 
98 See id. (deeming harshness an inevitable byproduct of shaming punishments). 
99 Critics in this camp set a low bar on what constitutes decency. See, e.g., 
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 
1279, 1289 (2000) (“[R]ules of decency speak, as a general matter, to problems in 
differentiating the human from the bestial.”). 
100 See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 758 (“[S]haming 
penalties violate an offender’s dignity, which no morally decent state should do.”). 
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the decent society.”101  Although this critique is related to the 
first critique of dignity,102 its primary focus is not on the 
individual being punished, but instead upon the punisher and 
the larger society’s degradation as a result of shaming 
punishments.103  As Professor Markel’s scholarship emphasizes, 
“shaming sanctions encourage a practice that inevitably coarsens 
our sensitivity to the dignity of other persons, and thus, 
ourselves.”104  This erosion of dignity commensurately erodes the 
essential decency of society.105  A decent state should not engage 
in punishment practices that allow this erosion to occur.106 
Eric Posner articulates another decency critique that builds 
upon this connection to dignity in its concern for the normalizing 
effect of shaming and how it incites an unacceptable urge to 
degrade through the exploitation of crowd dynamics.107  As 
Professor Massaro also points out, “[t]he decency concern is based 
on the sense that shaming may be cruel and that normalizing 
cruelty may encourage its proliferation . . . .”108  The 
communicative stigmatic effect of shaming punishments, which  
 
 
101 AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 262 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 
1996). 
102 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 223 (“A decent society . . . would treat its 
citizens with respect for their human dignity, rather than degrading or humiliating 
them. A decent society would also protect its citizens from at least some types of 
degradation or humiliation.”). 
103 See, e.g., Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2176 (noting how 
some punishments degrade both the punished and the punishers); Toni M. Massaro, 
The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
645, 702 (1997) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame Implications] (discussing the primacy 
“of preserving the community’s commitment to decency, not preserving the offender’s 
dignity per se” with this critique of shaming). 
104 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220. 
105 See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 649 (arguing that 
criminal shaming irreparably damages social norms of decency through the 
degradation of individual dignity). 
106 See MARGALIT, supra note 101, at 1 (asserting humiliation should not be an 
institutional practice of a decent society). 
107 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 106 (2000) (deeming shaming 
punishments to be “messy” as “[t]hey are intended to exploit the independent force of 
crowd dynamics, but crowd dynamics are unpredictable”). 
108 Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 699. 
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demarks the subhuman status of criminal offenders109 and which 
often snowballs with its dissemination to the public,110 does not 
jibe with a decent, egalitarian political state.111 
Building upon this latter analysis, another decency critique 
emphasizes how shaming punishments are unacceptable because 
they incite the potential for a state-initiated, uncontrollable mob 
mentality.112  Professor Whitman centers his primary rejection of 
shaming punishments on this aspect, stating that “[t]he chief evil 
in public humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and 
politically dangerous, complicity between the state and the 
crowd” and deeming them “a peculiarly disturbing . . . species of 
official lynch justice.”113  Therefore, Whitman’s concern with 
shaming sanctions is that once the state initiates them, it no 
longer has the ability to control the manner in which the public 
will treat the punished individual.114  Professor Nussbaum shares 
this concern about the loss of control with shaming punishments: 
“Shaming behavior is not to be easily trusted, or taken at face 
value.  It can easily get out of control, and it will be difficult both 
to keep it tethered to genuinely valuable norms and to calibrate 
it properly.”115  This state-initiated devolution of control through 
the public’s infliction of shaming as a punishment certainly 
conflicts with notions of decency in society, as they indicate the 
government’s perilous willingness “to delegate part of its 
enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general 
populace.”116  This can lead to an interminable punishment, 
which lacks “any redemptive, dues-paid end point.”117  Clearly, a  
 
 
109 See GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 5 (analyzing the subordination and 
stigmatization of the shamed). 
110 See POSNER, supra note 107, at 95 (noting the problem of shaming is “that 
the government cannot control the level of ostracism it provokes”). 
111 See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 700 (arguing shaming 
punishments are, “and should be, jarring in a political order that makes equality a 
cultural baseline”). 
112 See Robinson, supra note 53, at 485 (discussing how shaming opponents have 
an especial concern with “the chance of incidents of vigilantism against shamed 
defendants, which they believe promote a spirit of public indecency and brutality”). 
113 Whitman, Shame Sanctions, supra note 96, at 1059. 
114 See id. at 1088. Professor Posner is likewise troubled by this aspect of 
shaming penalties. See POSNER, supra note 107, at 106. 
115 NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 220. 
116 Whitman, Shame Sanctions, supra note 96, at 1088. 
117 Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 694. 
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decent state should not inflict shaming punishments that last in 
perpetuity; however, this critical view advances this very 
potentiality as a basis for their rejection.118 
Additionally, there is a proportionality and efficacy critique 
of shaming that revolves around decency.119  As Stephen Garvey 
articulates, “Insofar as shaming penalties, unlike fines and 
imprisonment, are intended to make an offender’s actual 
emotional response a part of the severity of the sanction, they 
make the proportionality calculus much more difficult, increasing 
the risk of disproportionate punishment.”120  Professor Massaro 
deems this calibration regarding the proportionality of shaming 
punishments to be unfeasible.121  Because of this inconsistency, 
shaming penalties can have an unstable or unanticipated effect, 
which violates notions of decency in the administration and 
impact of criminal punishment.122 
There is also an equality argument in the decency critique of 
shaming punishments.  Here, Professor Massaro provides a 
compelling stance that a danger of the ad hoc nature of shaming 
is that the most likely group to be targeted consists of individuals 
with the least political and social capital.123  The equality 
argument also rejects shaming sanctions as they can lead to 
disproportionately punitive penalties for these offenders that 
exceed any recognized parameters of specific or general 
deterrence.124  Further, as Professor Posner notes, the potential 
spillover effect of stigma in shaming, whereby individuals 
associated with the offender are collaterally stigmatized, 
certainly violates notions of equality in a decent society.125  Under  
 
 
118 See, e.g., Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1937–38 (noting how 
shaming does not work within a discrete time period). 
119 See, e.g., id. at 1937–40 (detailing a proportionality critique of criminal 
shaming, which has no place in a decent society). 
120 Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 748. 
121 See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 692 (describing this 
fine-tuning as impractical). 
122 See id. (discussing this widely variant effect in a critique of shaming 
sanctions). 
123 See Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1940. 
124 See id. at 1941 (discussing the disconnections between deterrence and 
shaming punishments for socially marginalized offenders). 
125 See POSNER, supra note 107, at 93 (noting how shaming can also target the 
punished’s family members). 
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this critique, because shaming punishments violate notions of 
equality, which are at the core of decent democracy, they should 
be rejected as means of discipline. 
Working with similar roots of this equality and decency 
critique, the hierarchical nature of criminal shaming 
punishments, which was previewed by Professor Kahan’s first 
article on shaming,126 has also been criticized as a characteristic 
that is not expressive of the decency of an egalitarian society.127  
As articulated by Jessica Clarke, “Shaming penalties have 
historically been employed to reaffirm class relationships and 
reinforce the shamed person’s subordinate status.”128  Professor 
Nussbaum has also criticized shaming punishments as being 
contradictory to decency with this respect:  “[T]here is surely 
something indecent about the idea that a liberal society, one built 
upon ideas of human dignity and equality, and respect for the 
individual, would express [a hierarchy of a ‘normal class above 
the shamed’] through its public system of law.”129 
Another lens of this hierarchical critique was expressed by 
Professor Kahan in his 2006 article What’s Really Wrong with 
Shaming Sanctions,130 which recants his 1996 article, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?.131  In this latter article, Kahan 
determined that “[w]hat’s really wrong with shaming 
penalties . . . is that they are deeply partisan: when society picks 
them, it picks sides, aligning itself with those who subscribe to 
norms that give pride of place to community and social 
differentiation rather than to individuality and equality.”132  
Adopting the Gusfield-Wildavsky theory of expressive political 
economy,133 Kahan formulated that shaming punishments suffer 
from a lack of expressive overdetermination, in that they “bear 
meanings perceived as affirming the values of only some cultural 
 
126 See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text. 
127 See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 21 (2015) 
(quoting Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2086–88) (“[M]any 
egalitarians oppose shaming practices as being ‘characteristic of hierarchical 
relationships.’ ”). 
128 See id. at 21–22. 
129 NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232 (emphasis in original). 
130 See Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2075. 
131 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 591. 
132 Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2076. 
133 See id. at 2081–82 (describing the sociopolitical basis for this perspective). 
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perspectives and as denigrating others.”134  For Kahan, the true 
problem of shaming punishments is that they “resonate with 
significations of hierarchy and community that assault the 
sensibilities of those who favor more egalitarian and 
individualistic forms of social organization.”135  This risk of 
hegemonic partisanship runs counter to the ideals of a decent 
society.136 
Consequently, the decency critique of criminal shaming 
punishments is a multifaceted one.  It provides that the erosion 
of dignity that is inherent in shaming penalties results in a 
commensurate erosion of decency within society.  It argues that 
shaming penalties introduce the malevolent normalization of 
cruelty.  This argument has pointed concern with how shaming 
can lead to uncontrollable outcomes via the government’s 
delegation of punishment through the transfer of the imposition 
of stigma on the offender to the unpredictable populace.  It also 
argues that shaming sanctions fail to meet effective punishment 
theory parameters as they lack proportionality, and, therefore, 
efficacy; in sum, these sanctions exceed any type of general or 
specific deterrence requirements.  Finally, this critique argues 
that shaming penalties—characterized by their hierarchical and 
hegemonic means—violate notions of equality at the heart of a 
decent society.  Each prong of the decency critique provides a 
valid basis for the discontinuation of the use of shaming 
punishments in the American criminal justice system. 
3. A Moral-Educative Mission 
Criminal shaming punishments have also been criticized in 
terms of their inabilities to fulfill an overall moral-educative 
mission.137  Criminal punishments should not just deter, punish, 
 
134 Id. at 2085. 
135 Id. at 2087. 
136 Id. at 2076. This perception has been criticized. See Markel, Wrong Turns, 
supra note 92, at 1393 (criticizing Kahan’s recanting perspective because it indicates 
“that the state should not pursue punishments that lack public consensus because a 
liberal state should remain neutral among the competing worldviews of diverse 
citizens”). 
137 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards A Theory of 
Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2677 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of 
tailoring an appropriate shaming punishment for a defendant that will educate the 
individual about conduct avoidance and lead him or her towards more positive 
outcomes). 
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or incentivize; they must also instruct and educate.138  This 
moral-educative perspective on punishment comes from “the 
Durkheimian functionalist notion that the criminal law serves to 
identify and reinforce basic social norms about right and wrong, 
that ‘[c]rime brings together upright consciences and 
concentrates them.’ ”139  Professor Garvey illuminates this point 
by focusing on the moral education or moral reform theory of 
punishment, whereby punishment is designed to provide moral 
instruction to the offender through bilateral dialogue, rather 
than through unilateral condemnation.140  However, Garvey 
deems shaming as a punishment that does not satisfy moral 
education parameters; it is, instead, “a monologue in which the 
state expresses its disapproval and disavowal of the offender’s 
wrongdoing,”141 which “do[es] little to educate.”142 
Another aspect of the moral-educative mission critique 
extends the focus from the punished individual to the community 
that also must endure the shaming penalty, which connects with 
key aspects of the decency critique.143  This particular argument 
analyzes the negative net-widening educative effects of shaming 
punishments in terms of naturalizing citizens to rights 
constriction, rather than educating them for active participation 
in a liberal democracy.144  As advanced by Steven Schulhofer, this 
view asserts that the government’s use of shaming sanctions 
results in ever-increasing attempts by the state to place people 
within the vise of social control.145  Therefore, in line with  
 
 
138 See Mark K. Moller, Comment, Sympathy, Community, and Promising: 
Adam Smith’s Case for Reviving Moral Consideration, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 241 
(1999) (emphasizing these functions of law). 
139 Tonry, supra note 81, at 1764 (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF 
LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simson trans., Free Press 1933)). 
140 See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 738–39, 742, 763 
(outlining the moral education theory of punishment and defining the nature of its 
expressive impact). 
141 Id. at 763. 
142 Id. at 784. 
143 See supra Part II.B.2. 
144 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 237 (discussing this argument against 
shaming). 
145 See id. at 236 (citing to personal correspondence with Stephen Schulhofer for 
the basis for his claims). 
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Professor Nussbaum’s view, shaming does “not function as a 
progressive reform, but rather as an agent of increased social 
homogeneity and social control.”146 
Shaming punishments do not teach lessons regarding 
dignity, decency, or other positive moral values.147  As stated by 
Professor Markel, “[P]unishment should aim at connecting the 
offender to an understanding of lawfulness and give the offender 
an opportunity to internalize those lawful values in the life he [or 
she] leads during and after the retributive encounter.”148  
However, shaming sanctions provide no opportunities for 
atonement and fail to fulfill any form of a moral-educative 
mission.149  Instead, as Professor Markel concludes, shaming 
results in, “at most, a retributive spectacle that is devoid of other 
positive community-expressive or community-reinforcing 
content,”150 and that can have a rights-constriction spillover effect 
for the greater community.151  Therefore, criminal shaming 
punishments are not compatible with the educative mission of 
instruction of liberal moral values in a civic democracy.152 
4. Conclusion 
Criminal shaming punishments “exhibit none of the features 
necessary to create a ‘political community united by basic 
principles’ of decency and dignity.”153  They also fail to fulfill any 
 
146 Id. at 237. 
147 See Tonry, supra note 81, at 1755 (categorizing Professor Kahan’s “theory of 
disintegrative shaming [as one] that takes traditional sociological ideas about the 
moral-educative effects of punishment and humane modern ideas about 
‘reintegrative shaming’ and turns them into deeply repressive ideas about the use of 
human beings to the end of appeasing public appetites for ‘debasement’ ”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
148 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220. 
149 See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 
1812 (1999) (“[S]hame forms no part of the atonement model. Guilt leads to 
atonement; shame leads nowhere.”). 
150 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2180 (emphasis omitted). 
151 See supra notes 125, 144 and accompanying text. 
152 See, e.g., Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2228 (arguing the 
embrace of intentional degradation in shaming punishments renders them 
incompatible with liberal virtues); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The 
Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 
963 (2003) (noting the attenuated educative effects of criminal law shaming 
sanctions). 
153 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2228 (quoting Stephen 
Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?, 
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of the aspects of a moral-educative mission approach to 
punishment theory.154  Consequently, under each of the critiques 
of criminal shaming penalties—dignity, decency, and a moral-
educative mission—these punishments should be abandoned as 
sanctions in the American criminal justice system. 
C. The Philosophical Rejection of School-Shaming Punishments 
Many K-12 schools have adopted a retributively punitive 
approach, rather than a rehabilitative or reformative one, in 
disciplining their students.155  Within this educational 
disciplinary approach, the use of disintegrative shaming 
punishments has flourished.156  However, shaming discipline has 
no more place in the schoolhouse than it does in criminal law.  
The core philosophical critiques of criminal shaming—dignity, 
decency, and a moral-educative mission—support the 
philosophical rejection of school-shaming punishments.157  In fact, 
these critiques have more resonance in an educational milieu 
because the key tenets of dignity, decency, and a moral-educative 
mission are the desired pedagogical goals and civic aims of 
 
in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 11, 14 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe 
eds., 2000)). 
154 See supra Part II.B.3. 
155 See Marilyn Armour, Restorative Practices: Righting the Wrongs of 
Exclusionary School Discipline, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2016) (discussing 
“increasingly negative school climates” and “educators’ retributive orientation to 
student behavior”); Fedders, supra note 52, at 569 (“No longer viewed as deserving 
of second chances or entitled to rehabilitation efforts, students are seen as meriting 
harsh and punitive treatment.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the 
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 436, 494 (1980) (identifying the “retributive element to school 
discipline”). 
156 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline Reform: 
Incorporating the Supreme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
933, 954 (2013) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
511 (1969)) (arguing that schools for many reasons, including their infliction of 
shaming punishments, have become “enclaves of totalitarianism”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
157 See William Haft, More than Zero: The Cost of Zero Tolerance and the Case 
for Restorative Justice in Schools, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 795, 800 (2000) (emphasis 
omitted) (discussing the heightened moral responsibility educators have in 
fashioning disciplinary policies of dignity and decency and urging a philosophical-
pedagogical approach to determine whether a disciplinary policy “ought to be 
enforced from an educational standpoint”). 
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American education.158  Therefore, the violations that occur when 
shaming is imposed in schools tear apart the very foundations of 
what public schooling in a liberal democratic state should be. 
This Section of the Article demonstrates the applicability of 
the core critiques of criminal shaming onto school shaming to 
support the rejection of these sanctions in the educational 
environment.159  Although this philosophical argument applies 
equally to all school shaming,160 it will use the paradigmatic 
examples of strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code 
shaming punishments, and denials of gender-identity restroom 
access as concrete illustrations of why schools must abandon the 
shaming form of discipline.161  Because school-shaming 
punishments are violative of dignity, decency, and a moral- 
 
 
158 See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of 
Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 444 (1995) (arguing American public schools must 
inculcate students with the values of individual dignity); Thomas C. Grey, How To 
Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on the Stanford Experience, 
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891, 928 (1996) (discussing how “conventions of decency” are 
paramount in public schools); Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting 
the Student-Critic in Public Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253, 267–68 (2012) 
(articulating the American pedagogical philosophies that emphasize a moral-
educative mission in preparation of students for citizenship). 
159 This approach is appropriate given the parallels between school discipline 
and criminal punishment. See, e.g., Cara Suvall, Essay, Restorative Justice in 
Schools: Learning from Jena High School, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 565 
(2009) (identifying retributive justice as a common denominator between school 
discipline and criminal justice punishments). 
160 School-shaming punishments are not limited to this Article’s examples. See, 
e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002) (discussing a school policy that 
would shame students by barring their access to extracurricular activities for a 
refusal to consent to a monitored, suspicionless drug urinalysis test). Although an 
exhaustive catalogue of such punishments goes beyond the scope of this Article, this 
philosophical rejection extends to all rights-violative punitive school-shaming 
measures. 
161 These shaming punishments are particularly appropriate for a legal 
philosophical rejection, as they all violate students’ constitutional rights as well. See 
Cooley, supra note 27 (manuscript at 31, 42–43) (arguing compelled apologies are 
violative of students’ First Amendment rights and strip searches are violative of 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights). Future scholarship by this author will 
advocate that gender-discriminatory dress code violation punishments and 
transgender student restroom access denials are violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
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educative mission—and are therefore violative of the guiding 
philosophies of K-12 American education—they should and must 
be rejected as school disciplinary measures.162 
1. Dignity 
School-shaming punishments are antithetical to the concept 
of dignity, which is a central tenet of the pedagogical goals and 
moral aims of American schools.163  Specific examples of school-
shaming sanctions that degrade students, depriving them of their 
dignity, include strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code 
shaming punishments, and restroom access denials.164  By 
examining how school shaming violates dignity, it becomes clear 
that the same dignitary concerns raised in critiques of criminal 
law shaming sanctions are present in the evaluation of the 
validity of shaming sanctions in schools.  Specifically, school-
shaming penalties—like their criminal equivalents—are 
inapposite to notions of equality of dignity, result in the 
degradation of humanity, and impose a permanent harm through 
loss of dignity on both an individual and transactional level in 
violation of the social norms of a civic democracy.165  
Consequently, like the dignity critique of criminal shaming, a 
dignity critique of educational shaming supports the view that 
these practices should be abandoned as disciplinary measures as 
they are violative of the pedagogical goal of dignity.166 
Strip searches are a type of school shaming that poses a 
“serious affront to human dignity.”167  School strip searches 
qualify as shaming rituals, because they are administered in a 
 
162 See Brown, supra note 158, at 315 (“[A]ppropriate responses to 
[school]children should be grounded in . . . respect for children as persons.”). 
163 See, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 169, 204 n.177 (2011) (characterizing equality and dignity as core functions of 
American public schools); Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of 
Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1988) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of “the overriding constitutional 
objective of affirming human dignity” in schools). 
164 See infra text accompanying notes 167–194. 
165 See infra text accompanying notes 195–202. 
166 See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit 
Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 800 (2017) (emphasizing the critical role schools can 
and should play in “conveying in word and deed that all students are entitled to 
equal respect and dignity”). 
167 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 347 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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punitive way in front of some type of school community audience 
when a student is suspected of noncompliant behavior and are 
inherently shaming based.168  The indignity of school strip 
searches and the corresponding degradation of students169 have 
no place in an environment that is preparing students for 
citizenship in a liberal democracy.170  Strip searches “impose 
unjustified humiliation”171 and assure harm.172  This harmful 
humiliation in the K-12 context was recognized by the Supreme 
Court to give rise to a constitutional injury173 in Safford Unified 
School District No. 1 v. Redding, which held that a student’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a school strip 
search.174  Given the indisputable indignity of student strip 
searches, they should no longer be used as a disciplinary 
shaming method as they do not align with the aim of dignity in 
the schooling of American children. 
Compelled apologies that are used as school-shaming 
punishments for subjective value judgment forms of discipline 
also frustrate the pedagogical goal of dignity.175  These shaming 
sanctions are problematic when school officials deem student 
speech discreditable or dishonorable,176 but it does not 
 
168 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) 
(finding a student’s exposure of the body “for a search is responding to an accusation 
reserved for suspected wrongdoers”). 
169 See id. at 376–77 (discussing these characteristics of student strip searches). 
170 See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of 
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems 
of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 348 (1988) (deeming strip 
searches to be procedures of degradation that require safeguards to protect 
“[h]umaneness and [r]espect for [i]ndividual [d]ignity”). 
171 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 1001 
(2016). 
172 See Florence, 566 U.S. at 345 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling strip searches 
“inherently harmful, humiliating, and degrading”). 
173 See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the 
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1018 (2014) 
(discussing the Court’s discovery of “a constitutional injury in humiliation” in 
Redding). 
174 See Redding, 557 U.S. at 368. 
175 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating 
Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 125 (2004) 
(discussing how apology should not be used “to inflict pain,” “satisfy the community’s 
bloodlust,” or “ostracize offenders”). 
176 See, e.g., T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767, 789 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (finding a school policy that required a compelled apology 
for dishonorable or discreditable student conduct “introduce[d] a nebulous degree of 
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“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” as required 
for constitutional regulation per Tinker.177  Here, a compelled 
apology expresses that the penalized student should be 
condemned by school authority figures for the speech,178 despite 
the student’s First Amendment rights to engage in such 
expressive conduct.179  When used in cases where students are 
punished for constitutionally protected sexually expressive 
behavior,180 these punishments become mechanisms of slut-
shaming primarily female students.181  In all of these 
circumstances, forced apologies defy the justifications offered by 
their proponents that they “promote harmony by offering truth, 
breaking punitive cycles, and analyzing the original cause of 
discord.”182  Instead, they are painfully humiliating social rituals 
designed to exact suffering on the punished individual.183  
Consequently, forced apologies, which issue from the  
 
 
value judgment [because i]ssues of character and values involve such a broad 
spectrum of reasonable interpretation (but also strongly-held disagreement) as to be 
insufficiently conclusive for a disciplinary standard”). 
177 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
178 See LiJia Gong & Alina Hoffman, Note, Sexting and Slut-Shaming: Why 
Prosecution of Teen Self-Sexters Harms Women, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 577, 583 
(2012) (arguing against these destrucitvely critical forms of school shaming). 
179 See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1028, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(determining that a reasonably competent school official would be aware that a 
forced apology for nondisruptive, nonobscene, and nonschool-sponsored speech—
specifically, the truthful reporting of criminal and tortious behavior—violated the 
student’s First Amendment rights). 
180 See, e.g., T.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 784–85 (determining that a compelled 
apology for two female high school students who engaged in off-campus sexually 
expressive online speech that did not meet the Tinker standard of regulation was a 
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights). 
181 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 353 n.47 (2014) (“ ‘Slut-shaming’ criticizes women for 
[any type of conduct related to] sexual activity.”); see also Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape 
Culture, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (2016) (noting how this oppressive 
phenomenon is often inflicted as a hierarchal weapon against marginalized women). 
182 Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1539 (2009). 
183 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal 
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 384 (2006) (describing the humiliation of a 
compelled apology). 
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enforcement of value judgment-laden disciplinary policies, should 
be abandoned as they are violative of the pedagogical and moral 
aims of instilling dignity in the American classroom. 
Dress code violation shaming punishments also are in direct 
conflict with the pedagogical goal of dignity.184  “[E]merging 
conceptions of gender equality and identity should alter outdated 
dress code rules”185 to eliminate the indignity of such shaming 
punishments.  For sanctions of dress codes that focus on the 
ideology that girls should dress modestly, the implication is that 
such girls are immodest, and without dignity, and invite 
“disruption because the presumptively heterosexual male 
students would be distracted.”186  Institutional disdain for 
effeminate boys is perpetuated through dress code shaming 
punishments that treat or impact male students differently, 
thereby divesting penalized boys of their dignity.187  Transgender 
students are also often targeted by dress code violations, based 
on discriminatory treatment and sex and gender stereotyping 
that stand in direct opposition to the concepts of fundamental 
dignity of all students.188  Given the indignity that is imputed 
upon both boys and girls by dress code shaming punishments, 
they should no longer be used as a disciplinary method as they do 
not align with the pedagogy of equality of dignity in the schooling 
of American children. 
 
 
184 In some instances, dress code violations have led to the arrest of children, 
which is an extreme example of how these shaming punishments take away the 
essential dignity of students. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005) (“[P]olice have been used to enforce a 
school’s internal rules of conduct, with children arrested for . . . violating the student 
dress code.”). 
185 Brown, supra note 158, at 288. 
186 RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, 
AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 73 (2013). 
187 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1403 (2010) (discussing the 
existence within American culture of “strong reactions, sometimes bordering on 
disgust, toward effeminate men and boys”). 
188 See Holly V. Franson, Comment, The Rise of the Transgender Child: 
Overcoming Societal Stigma, Institutional Discrimination, and Individual Bias To 
Enact and Enforce Nondiscriminatory Dress Code Policies, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 
518–22 (2013) (outlining dignitary and legal claims against schools involving 
transgender students being targeted by dress code shaming punishments). 
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Finally, restroom shaming practices that bar transgender 
students from using the restroom that conforms with their 
gender identity or that require transgender students to use a 
segregated restroom that is not used by other students are in 
direct opposition to the pedagogical goal of dignity.189  These 
restroom mandates are shaming punishments that fall squarely 
into the category of a state-sponsored “othering” of transgender 
students for a violation of claimed school community norms.190  It 
is ironic that schools have raised dignity claims as purported 
justifications for these shaming punishments,191 because they 
categorically deny the dignity of the targeted students.192  Schools 
should teach students that they have fundamental liberties of 
dignity.193  However, these restroom access denials erode the 
fundamental dignity of the student because they are premised on 
his or her gender identity not conforming with the school’s 
primacy on birth-assigned sex.194  Given the indignity that is 
forced upon transgender students by restroom shaming 
mandates, these shaming devices should no longer be permitted 
as they do not align with the aim of dignity in the schooling of 
American children. 
The examination of these school-shaming examples 
affirmatively gives rise to the same dignity concerns that have 
been at the forefront of the critique of criminal shaming 
 
189 See Henry, supra note 163, at 203 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence continues to rely on equality as dignity to give substance to its 
egalitarian mandate.”); M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating 
the Law To Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. 
REV. 943, 1004 (2015) (characterizing institutional restroom access discrimination 
against transgender individuals as an act of shaming and a “refus[al] to recognize 
transgender people as people”). 
190 See Developments in the Law—Transgender Youth and Access to Gendered 
Spaces in Education, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1728 (2014) [hereinafter Transgender 
Youth] (noting the difficulty in teaching community when transgender youth, as “a 
highly visible minority [are] forced to suffer based solely on who they are”). 
191 See infra text accompanying note 208. 
192 See Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Securing Equal Access to Sex-
Segregated Facilities for Transgender Students, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 
306–07 (2013) (analyzing the degradation that transgender students endure when 
forced to use gender-inappropriate or segregated restroom facilities). 
193 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (discussing liberty 
rights attached to dignity). 
194 See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 
749 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the loss of dignity incurred by a transgender student 
when he was subjected to a restroom shaming mandate). 
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punishments.  School shaming, like criminal shaming, eradicates 
individual dignity and imposes stigma195 in the ways examined 
by Professors Goffman, Massaro, and Nussbaum.196  By stripping 
away the targeted student’s humanity,197 shaming degrades the 
civic democratic ideals of dignity and equality that should be at 
the core of public schools’ values198 and disciplinary practices.199  
This degradation is squarely within the ambit of Professor 
Markel’s dignity critique of criminal shaming sanctions.200  In 
fact, this degradation is amplified because its targets are 
schoolchildren,201 as opposed to convicted criminal defendants. 
The taking away of dignity, which results from school-
shaming punishments, is not a fleeting consequence, either.  Like 
criminal shaming punishments, these educational sanctions 
often result in significant, long-lasting reputational damage to 
the penalized student.202  This harm can result in subsequent 
legal and civil disabilities,203 permanent emotional and 
 
195 See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (discussing the stigmatizing effect of 
shaming punishments through their removal of dignity and “reinforce[ment of] the 
shamed person’s subordinate status”). 
196 See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text. 
197 See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (describing shaming as conflicting with a 
liberal democratic society’s ideals). 
198 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 54 (1983) (arguing schools should promote 
values of equality and “respect for individual dignity”); Robert Trager & Joseph A. 
Russomanno, Free Speech for Public School Students: A “Basic Educational 
Mission,” 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 275, 301 (1993) (arguing respect for individual dignity 
should be fostered in public schools). 
199 See Sarah Jane Forman, Countering Criminalization: Toward a Youth 
Development Approach to School Searches, 14 SCHOLAR 301, 373 (2011) (“[Schools’] 
disciplinary policies and practices should comport with their special role in the 
socialization of future democratic citizens; to this end, they should respect students’ 
autonomy, dignity, and individual rights.”). 
200 See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
201 See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging A 
Constitutional Campaign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 
82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 995 (2009) (arguing schools have the educational and 
constitutional responsibility “to affirm the dignity of each student”). 
202 See Melissa Mortazavi, Consuming Identities: Law, School Lunches, and 
What It Means To Be American, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2014) 
(discussing how children’s impressionability means that schools often determine the 
permanent dignity and self-respect of students). 
203 See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: 
Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 75, 147–48 (2000) (arguing that labeling individuals as deviant, which 
results from shaming, can lead to future deviant behavior and further punishments). 
FINAL_COOLEY 6/16/2018  11:11 AM 
822 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:793   
psychological harms,204 and deleterious collateral consequences205 
that run parallel to the harms articulated by Professor 
Nussbaum.206  These collateral consequences impact both the 
individual student and the greater school community.207  By 
teaching students that it is appropriate to stigmatize students 
through shaming, schools stand in direct contravention with 
their long-standing role of inculcating “an understanding that 
citizenship . . . should include attention to the dignity and safety 
of other[s].”208  Finally, the violations of transactional dignity that 
result from school shaming are commensurate, if not more 
magnified,209 with the transactional dignity harms that are 
incurred by criminal shaming as outlined by Professor 
Whitman.210  Consequently, analyzing school shaming through 
the lens of personal dignity being a basic right of humanity,211 
 
204 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
949, 1005 (2009) (discussing the anger that results from punitive shaming); Clarke, 
supra note 127, at 22 (“Those targeted by shaming practices often internalize 
stigma, coming to believe themselves to be deficient.”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Family 
Assimilation Demands and Sexual Minority Youth, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1393 
(2014) (categorizing behaviors that “convey messages that gender nonconformity or 
same-sex orientation is shameful, sinful, or otherwise devalued” as harmful to the 
long-term physical and mental health of LGBT youth). 
205 See Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional 
Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2006) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 43) (highlighting 
the immunizing effect shaming has on its intended targets and its inverse effect of 
intended deterrence); Mortazavi, supra note 202, at 21 (“[W]hat is normalized (or 
stigmatized) in the school setting often directly modifies and supplants the child’s 
original sense of identity.”). 
206 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
207 See Brown, supra note 201, at 994 (discussing how school disciplinary 
measures, like shaming, demonstrate mistreatment of other students and result in a 
lack of general deterrence). 
208 Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: 
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1476 
(2011) (discussing educators’ long-standing role against bullying as “they endeavor 
to teach children and adults alike how to treat others with respect”). 
209 See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (discussing how the loss of dignity and 
exclusion from the stigma of shaming results in a breakdown of community empathy 
for the stigmatized). 
210 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
211 See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More 
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 118 (1978) 
(“Because the concept of personal dignity is basic to humanity, it can serve as a 
useful focus for our attempt to apply moral values, such as fairness, to our 
perception of the persons, institutions, and forces confronting us.”). 
FINAL_COOLEY 6/16/2018  11:11 AM 
2017] AGAINST SHAMING 823 
like scholars have done for criminal shaming,212 yields a similarly 
strong, if not stronger, critique against the use of such sanctions 
within the schoolhouse as disciplinary measures.213 
Sadly, an aspect of shaming punishments that has been 
advocated as a benefit for some scholars in the criminal law 
context is the imposition of stigma on and loss of dignity for the 
punished individual.214  However, a core civic aim of American 
schools is to teach, maintain, and protect an environment of 
human dignity.215  As argued by Ronald Dworkin, such 
“principles of human dignity that . . . are embodied in the 
Constitution and are now common ground in America” should be 
a “dominant pedagogical strategy” in America’s K-12 public 
schools.216  As defined by Leslie Meltzer Henry, “equality as 
dignity” consists of these elements: 
First, dignity is universal.  It is an intrinsic quality of all 
human beings, bestowed upon individuals not by social rank, 
but simply by nature of being human.  Human existence, 
whether derived from God’s image or as an icon of humanity, 
confers dignity.  Second, dignity is permanent.  Unlike 
institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity does not wax 
and wane, but instead remains constant.  Third, as a 
consequence of these two features, dignity functions as a 




212 See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text. 
213 See Maryam Ahranjani, Can They Do That to Me?! Does the Eighth 
Amendment Protect Children’s Best Interests?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 403, 404 (2011) 
(discussing the Framers’ concern with “protecting citizens, particularly the most 
vulnerable, from government imposition of excessive punishment in recognition of 
human dignity”). 
214 See, e.g., Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 638 (positively 
framing shaming sanction consequences as “extremely unpleasant[, as t]hose who 
lose the respect of their peers often suffer a crippling diminishment of self-esteem”). 
215 See Martha Minow, Education for Co-Existence, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002) 
(arguing schools should aspire to “join every person in the network of mutual 
recognition, individual dignity, and equality”); Miriam Rokeach & John Denvir, 
Front-Loading Due Process: A Dignity-Based Approach to School Discipline, 67 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 277, 278 (2006) (advocating that, as a matter of dignity, “[s]tudents, as 
citizens, have a right to an education as well as to fair and respectful treatment 
while obtaining it”). 
216 Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 21, 
2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2006/09/21/three-questions-for-america. 
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 reciprocity, all humans owe respect to, and deserve respect 
from, each other as beings of equal worth.  Whether young or 
old, sinner or saint, mentally high-performing or mentally 
disabled, each person deserves the same basic respect.217 
An egalitarian state must ascribe to this theory of equality 
as dignity in all of its institutions, including in its public 
schools.218  This concept—that “every person possesses dignity 
that requires the government to treat them with respect”—has 
“special significance in the educational setting.”219  In order for 
public schools to incorporate this principle in a way that fosters 
the well-being of children, administrators and teachers must 
provide students with a learning environment that allows for the 
safeguarding of individual and collective dignity.220  
Consequently, any disciplinary measure that erodes dignity, like 
shaming, must be eliminated from the schools’ behavioral 
management systems. 
2. Decency 
School-shaming punishments are also adversative to the 
concept of decency, which is another central tenet of the 
pedagogical goals and moral aims of American schools.221  
Specific examples of school-shaming sanctions that dissolve 
decency in the school community include strip searches, 
compelled apologies, dress code violation shaming punishments, 
and restroom access denials.222  By examining how school-
shaming punishments, such as these examples, violate decency, 
it becomes clear that the decency concerns raised in critiques of 
criminal law shaming are present in the evaluation of the 
 
217 Henry, supra note 163, at 202–03. 
218 See Alan E. Garfield, What Should We Celebrate on Constitution Day?, 41 GA. 
L. REV. 453, 498 (2007) (arguing “public schools should teach children that every 
individual is deserving of dignity and respect” because of the constitutional 
“commitment to create a society based on respect for human dignity”). 
219 Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 288. 
220 See Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 
WIS. L. REV. 79, 133–34 (“The way that school officials primarily go about providing 
for the well-being of children is to treat them with dignity and to provide them with 
an appropriate learning environment.”). 
221 See Dent Gitchel, Funding the Education of Arkansas’s Children: A 
Summary of the Problems and Challenges, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 25 
(2004) (arguing “the first priority of state government” is a decent education). 
222 See infra notes 225–256 and accompanying text. 
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validity of school-shaming sanctions.  Specifically, school-
shaming penalties, like their criminal equivalents, harm 
community decency through their erosion of individual dignity, 
normalize cruelty with often uncontrollable outcomes, fail to 
meet effective punishment theory requirements of either specific 
or general deterrence due to their lack of proportionality, and 
reinforce harmful notions of hierarchy and hegemony that run 
counter to the ideals of equality in a decent democratic society.223  
Consequently, like the decency critique of criminal shaming, a 
commensurate critique of educational shaming supports the view 
that they should be abandoned as disciplinary measures as they 
are violative of the social norm in educational theory of 
decency.224 
School-shaming strip searches undercut the pedagogical goal 
of decency.  All searching disciplinary schemes are inherently 
adversarial.225  This is magnified with school searches given the 
hierarchical and hegemonic power differential between the adult 
school actor and the targeted child.226  Shaming strip searches 
transcend the pedagogical goal of decency given that “the adverse 
psychological effect of a strip search is likely to be more severe 
upon a child than an adult, especially a child who has been the 
victim of sexual abuse.”227  Consequently, strip searches violate 
the tenets of decency as they excessively intrude upon and 
alienate the child’s acute vulnerability.228  This alienation of 
individual student dignity violates the concept of decency within 
the school community and normalizes cruelty.229  School strip 
 
223 See supra Part II.B.2. 
224 See Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 736 (2011) (“A state should run a decent public school 
system.”). 
225 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 677 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (noting the adversarial nature of school searches). 
226 See Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (D. Or. 2010) 
(discussing the harmful power dynamics when an adult searches a child). 
227 N.G. ex rel. S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2004). 
228 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 
(2009) (noting how the consistent experience of strip-searched children, “whose 
adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure,” is 
embarrassment, fright, and humiliation). 
229 See Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood: Legal 
Strategies To Combat the Use of Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 67, 99 (2007) (discussing the cruelty and violations of individual dignity in 
child strip searches). 
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searches are not proportional to the targeted student’s alleged 
offense, and thereby, they fail to meet effective punishment 
theory requirements that are required in a decent society.230  
Finally, strip searches of students have been “fairly understood 
as so degrading that a number of communities have decided that 
[they] are never reasonable and have banned them no matter 
what the facts may be.”231  These discrete community bans should 
be implemented nationwide, as school-shaming strip searches are 
not only “an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude,” 
but, “[m]ore than that: [they are] a violation of any known 
principle of human decency.”232 
Forced apologies that are used as school-shaming 
punishments also undermine the pedagogical goal of moral 
decency.233  The perceived injustice of a forced apology often 
results in a response of student entrenchment, whereby the 
students “harden[] their positions and elevat[e] their resistance 
through either overt or covert actions.”234  This shaming-anger 
cycle with all of its attendant, and perhaps uncontrollable, 
opprobrium often will infect an entire school community, thereby 
eroding any standing lessons of decent treatment of others.235  As 
a result, these punishments’ actual and perceived lack of 
proportionality fail to meet effective punishment theory 
requirements of deterrence.236  Further, there is something 
indecent about a society that forces “expressions of remorse 
because of the leverage” of disciplinary authority,237 where 
 
230 See Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 281, 347 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s determination that a 
student strip search was unconstitutional “in light of its lack of proportionality to 
the student’s [alleged] offense”). 
231 Redding, 557 U.S. at 375. 
232 Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984). 
233 See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Hijacked from Both Sides—Why Religious 
Extremists and Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Discourse 
on Criminal Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. 
REV. 103, 129 (2000) (arguing the most egregious shaming punishments are 
compelled apologies). 
234 Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights 
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1289 (2006). 
235 See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
236 See Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 
1620 (2015) (arguing forced apologies “cannot compel the feelings they are meant to 
express”). 
237 Griffin, supra note 182, at 1541. 
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“adults appear to ‘gang up’ on the child or attempt to ‘shame’ the 
child into . . . apology.”238  These harmful notions of hierarchy and 
hegemony do not agree with the egalitarian ideals of a liberal 
society’s educational system.239  Consequently, the indecency that 
results from using compelled apologies as shaming punishments 
serves as a basis for the cessation of their use in schools. 
Dress code shaming punishments are inapposite to the 
pedagogical goal of decency.  It is ironic that many dress code 
shaming advocates premise their support for these sanctions on 
claims of a “dress code of decency,”240 because these punishments 
operate in the inverse.241  They teach and perpetuate pernicious 
sex and gender stereotyping,242 which corrodes community 
decency through the harmful taking away of individual dignity of 
the penalized students and which normalizes cruelty.243  Further, 
the gender-biased enforcement and outcomes of dress code 
discipline instill a damaging environment of hierarchy and 
hegemony by reinforcing patriarchal, rather than egalitarian, 
norms within the schoolhouse.244 
 
238 Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: 
Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1167 
(2009). 
239 See Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence To Narrow the Tax 
Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 514 (2009) (noting the appeal of shaming to 
hierarchists but not to egalitarians). 
240 Lorraine Nencel, Professionalization, Sexualization: When Global Meets 
Local in the Working Identities of Secretaries in Lima, Peru, in THE GENDER 
QUESTION IN GLOBALIZATION: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 41, 51 (Tine 
Davids & Francien van Driel eds., 2005) (coining the term a “dress code of decency”); 
see also Haft, supra note 157, at 800 (“Educators who support dress codes often 
assert that they encourage discipline, enhance self-esteem, and promote unity in the 
school setting.”). 
241 See Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 372 (2008) (“Rather than being a benign reflection of 
cultural norms, gender-based dress codes . . . lie at the heart of the problem that 
equality guarantees seek to address.”). 
242 See Natalie Smith, Eliminating Gender Stereotypes in Public School Dress 
Codes: The Necessity of Respecting Personal Preference, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 251, 252 
(2012) (discussing school dress codes’ rigidity and perpetuation of “archaic gender-
based” stereotypes). 
243 See id. at 255–56; see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex 
Discrimination, and Public School Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043–44 
(2016). 
244 See Ann C. McGinley, Reconsidering Legal Regulation of Race, Sex, and 
Sexual Orientation, 50 TULSA L. REV. 341, 361–66 (2015) (detailing the 
interconnections between dress codes and “concepts of hierarchy, class, and gender”); 
see also Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the 
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Quite simply, the bulk of these student shaming 
punishments unequally and indecently burden female and 
effeminate male schoolchildren via enforcement of both sexually 
discriminatory dress codes and facially neutral ones.245  “Under 
the guise of social order,” these punishments inappropriately put 
the onus of “self-control, public decency, and sexual morality in 
the school on girls’ shoulders.”246  As argued by Professor 
Meredith Johnson Harbach, community-normed dress code 
violation punishments are not “entirely sanguine . . . [as they] 
automatically incorporate sexualized assumptions about girls’ 
bodies, reinforcing images of distracting female bodies that 
should be covered up.”247  Professor Noa Ben-Asher identifies a 
deep-rooted American cultural anxiety about male effeminacy as 
the basis for the judicial tendency since the 1980s “to uphold 
mandatory gender appearance policies in schools.”248  This results 
in an indecent “ ‘everyday pedagogy,’ [that] reproduce[s negative] 
normative gender and sexuality preferences.”249  The deleterious 
curriculum of these shaming punishments educates 
schoolchildren to shy away from effeminate boys, to sexualize 
girls, and to excuse boys’ objectification and harassment of girls 
as a biological response.250  These teaching lessons do not reflect 
the pedagogical goal of decency;251 they should be abandoned. 
 
Violence?, Essay, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 863 (2000) (discussing how the 
humiliation of women results from “a world that assigns radically different roles by 
gender, and monitors them through internalized notions of honor and shame”). 
245 See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1056–57 (identifying dress codes’ indecent 
imposition of “unequal burdens based on sex”). 
246 SHAUNA POMERANTZ, GIRLS, STYLE, AND SCHOOL IDENTITIES: DRESSING THE 
PART 8 (2008). 
247 See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1056. 
248 Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 
1216 (2016). 
249 Harbach, supra note 243, at 1044 (footnote omitted) (quoting Shauna 
Pomerantz, Cleavage in a Tank Top: Bodily Prohibition and the Discourses of School 
Dress Codes, 53 ALBERTA J. EDUC. RES. 373, 374 (2007)). 
250 See Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape 
Culture, TIME (May 22, 2015), http://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-school-dress-
codes-rape-culture (arguing school dress codes “teach[] our children that girls’ bodies 
are dangerous, powerful and sexualised, and that boys are biologically programmed 
to objectify and harass them”); Ben-Asher, supra note 248, at 1216. 
251 See Amy L. Wax, Against Nature—On Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 356 (1996) (noting how “[p]ublic shaming and stigmatization” 
clash with feminism as “they routinely have been used to control female sexuality 
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Finally, restroom access denials that bar transgender 
students from using the restroom that conforms with their 
gender identity or that require them to use a segregated 
restroom not used by other students sharply conflict with the 
pedagogical goal of decency.252  These restroom mandates 
impinge on students’ privacy in contravention of the protections 
of a decent society.253  Such actions clash with decent treatment 
that should be accorded to every student in a positive educational 
environment, and they will lead to additional retractions into 
indecency.254  As Professor Martha Minow argues, “Until every 
student is identified as different[,] . . . the tendency to create a 
‘normal’ group and to label others as ‘deviant’ will remain 
pronounced and take on forms of childish cruelty in the school 
setting.”255  By labeling transgender students as deviant through 
restroom access denials, schools reproduce injurious concepts of 
hegemony, hierarchy, and inequality.256  Denying transgender 
students access to restrooms conflicts with the pedagogical aims 
of a positive learning environment and results in a devolution 
from decency. Therefore, these shaming practices should no 
longer be utilized. 
The examination of these school-shaming punishments 
affirmatively gives rise to the same decency concerns that have 
been at the forefront of the critique of criminal shaming 
punishments.257  School-shaming sanctions erode school 
community decency through their erasure of individual student 
 
and female social choice or to place women on the front lines of efforts to curb male 
sexuality”). 
252 See Tobin & Levi, supra note 192, at 306–07 (discussing the indecent 
communicative impact that results from forcing transgender students to use gender-
inappropriate or segregated facilities). 
253 See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 405 (2003) (claiming “privacy as a pre-political value basic 
to a decent society”). 
254 See Transgender Youth, supra note 190, at 1729 (discussing how transgender 
youth fear discrimination, harassment, and violence in restrooms). 
255 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 31 (1990). 
256 See Tobin & Levi, supra note 192, at 307 (arguing transgender restroom 
access denials “communicate to the student and the entire community that he or she 
is not normal[, which] reinforces any bias that peers may have about the student 
and empowers them to engage in bullying”). 
257 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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dignity,258 similar to the dissolution that is at the core of 
Professor Markel’s criminal shaming decency critique.259  The 
normalization of cruelty is a natural result of school-shaming 
punishments,260 which is commensurate to the normalizing effect 
that Professors Posner and Massaro argued as a basis for the 
rejection of shaming in criminal law.261  This normalization of 
indecent treatment of schoolchildren is particularly 
problematic,262 as the community involvement aspect of shaming 
results in the school as state delegating—and likely losing—
punishment controls to the crowd within the school 
community.263  With a shaming punishment, a child “is held up to 
the moral judgment of persons whose opinions he [or she] values 
and is caused to feel unworthy of their esteem—or even their 
love—unless he [or she] changes.”264  The concerns about 
uncontrollable mob outcomes raised by Professors Whitman and 
Nussbaum in their decency critiques of criminal shaming265 
become magnified when extrapolated to school shaming as the 
crowd at issue consists of minor schoolchildren,266 whose  
 
 
258 See Fedders & Langberg, supra note 156, at 956 (footnotes omitted) (“The 
current school discipline regime is alienating and isolating, and increasingly instills 
in children a sense of hopelessness and despair.”); David Orentlicher, Spanking and 
Other Corporal Punishment of Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing 
Children, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 147, 177 (1998) (discussing how the undervaluation of 
children in American social institutions results in a failure to provide them a life of 
decency). 
259 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
260 See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 699 (“The decency 
concern is based on the sense that shaming may be cruel and that normalizing 
cruelty may encourage its proliferation, especially if the expressive accounts of 
punishment’s effects on norms hold true.”). 
261 See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
262 See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 ALA. L. REV. 111, 
166 (2010) (discussing how shaming enforces harmful gender-based norms). 
263 See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 
(2008) (arguing shaming is designed to generate emotions in the participating 
community). 
264 Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 39, 80 (2001). 
265 See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
266 See Susan Hanley Duncan, MySpace Is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping 
Children Safe from Sexual Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527, 
556 (2008) (discussing how interaction with peers or emotional stimulation 
dominates over individual cognitive control in adolescents). 
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cognitive, emotional, and social development is not yet 
complete267 and whose safety has been entrusted to the adult 
leaders of the school.268 
Additionally, school-shaming punishments fail to comply 
with the parameters of effective punishment theory.269  They 
result in neither specific nor general deterrence due to their lack 
of proportionality, which raises the same concerns used by 
Professors Garvey and Massaro in their rejection of criminal 
shaming sanctions through a decency lens.270  Finally, school 
shaming reinforces the same harmful notions of hierarchy and 
hegemony that Professor Nussbaum and eventually even 
Professor Kahan articulated as central foundations of opposition 
to criminal shaming punishments.271  As a result, school-shaming 
punishments conflict with the ideals of equality in a decent 
democratic society272 that were explored by Professors Massaro 
and Posner.273  These are the ideals that should be at the core of 
all decent liberal institutions, especially schools,274 whose 
pedagogy is essential to kids’ identity formation and 
 
267 See Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to 
Culpability and Rehabilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1474–82 (2012) (identifying 
the different stages of structural and functional maturation in the cognitive 
development of adolescents); Carina Muir, Comment, Protecting America’s Children: 
Why an Executive Order Banning Juvenile Solitary Confinement Is Not Enough, 44 
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 189 (2016) (“In terms of incomplete psychological development, 
adolescents’ prefrontal cortexes are not yet fully developed, leaving them more 
impulsive and vulnerable than adults, which also mitigates their decision-making 
ability.”). 
268 See Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: 
Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1738 (1993) (arguing schools 
must safeguard children). 
269 See John A. Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”: Legal Implications of the New 
Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 81–82 (2002) (discussing the 
lack of any empirical data to support a deterrence claim for shaming); Garvey, 
Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 753–54 (finding the lack of empirical 
inquiry regarding shaming punishments makes deterrence claims “highly 
speculative”). 
270 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text. 
272 See David C. Gray, Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. 55, 94 (2010) 
(discussing how shaming perpetuates status inequality and subordination). 
273 See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
274 See Patsy E. Johnson, Equity, Motivation, and Leadership: A Matter of 
Justice, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 53, 59 (2004) (“In schools, justice includes 
the belief that all children deserve a decent life and to have basic needs met such as 
safety, respect, a sense of belonging (in response to hostile and unfriendly 
environments), and fair treatment.”). 
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understanding of the meaning of a civic democracy.275  Instead, 
punitive shaming discipline leads to “a missed opportunity for 
positive socialization, affirming democratic norms, and meeting 
the developmental needs of students.”276  Consequently, the 
indecent power differential that is abused during school shaming 
requires its disuse, as liberal democracies must “insist that 
school officials behave with common decency to their students.”277 
For many shaming proponents in the criminal law context, 
the fact that shaming penalties are degradation ceremonies that 
require public participation is viewed as a positive attribute of 
these punishments.278  However, such tenets are not reflective of 
the ideals of decency that should be taught in public schools.279  
Decency is a key pedagogical goal and moral aim of American 
education,280 dating back to the earliest years of the United 
States’ democracy.281  As a corollary to teaching decency and 
guarding against the devolution of human behavior in order to 
maintain order in schools, schools should ascribe to the belief 
that “[i]f there are some punishments that are so barbaric that 
they may not be imposed for the commission of crimes, 
designated by our social system as the most thoroughly 
reprehensible acts an individual can commit, then . . . similar 
 
275 See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech 
Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 259 (1991) (discussing public schools’ 
“inculcation role and the importance [they play in] assimilating students into 
cultural norms of civility and decency”). 
276 Fedders & Langberg, supra note 156, at 956. 
277 Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach 
Us About the American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (1995). 
278 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 636 (characterizing this 
aspect of shaming in a positive way). 
279 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 282 (“[A] decent society needs to go further, 
finding ways to protect the dignity of its members against shame and stigma 
through law.”); Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement, Distributive Justice, and the 
Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669, 673 (2002) (describing public schools 
as “a highly egalitarian system”). 
280 See Lynn S. Brackman, Note, High Schools and the First Amendment: The 
Eighth Circuit Leaves Students’ Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate, 66 MO. L. REV. 169, 
177 (2001) (discussing American schools’ “responsibility to promote decency and 
civility among [their] students”). 
281 See Kate Strickland, Note, The School Finance Reform Movement, a History 
and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Reform?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 
1105, 1166 (1991) (describing a 1789 Massachusetts law that required schools to 
teach “decent behavior” to help students “understand that virtues such as piety, 
justice, industry and frugality would preserve and perfect the constitution, and 
secure the blessing of liberty”). 
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punishments may not be imposed . . . for . . . breaches of school 
discipline.”282  Just as criminal law shaming should be discarded 
under the decency critique, school shaming should be abandoned 
under the same critique.283  The continued preservation of 
decency as a core component of American public schools requires 
no less, because “[a] decent society is one whose institutions do 
not humiliate people.”284 
3. Moral-Educative Mission 
School-shaming punishments are asymmetrical to the 
fulfillment of a moral-educative mission, which is, perhaps, the 
most central tenet of the pedagogical goals and civic aims of 
American schools.285  Specific examples of school shaming that 
harm the moral-educative mission in the school community 
include strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code shaming 
punishments, and restroom access denials.286  By examining how 
school shaming violates the concept of a moral-educative mission, 
it becomes clear the same concerns raised in critiques of criminal 
law shaming are present in the evaluation of the validity of 
shaming sanctions in schools.287  School-shaming penalties, like 
their criminal equivalents, do not provide moral instruction or 
education to the targeted student or the larger school community; 
quite simply, they do not teach lessons regarding dignity, 
decency, or any other positive, rights-recognitive moral values.288  
Instead, school shaming teaches harmful notions of rights 
 
282 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 684 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
283 See Susan H. Bitensky, The Poverty of Precedent for School Corporal 
Punishment’s Constitutionality Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1327, 1370 (2009) (discussing how incompatibility between a punishment and 
standards of decency can be the basis for the invalidation of that punishment). 
284 MARGALIT, supra note 101, at 1. 
285 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Schools are places where we inculcate the values 
essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing 
citizenry.”); Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education 
Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion 
Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 759 (1997) (discussing how schools are charged 
with providing “education that inculcates democratic values—the civic republican 
virtues that will enable students to be citizens in society”). 
286 See infra notes 291–316 and accompanying text. 
287 Ann Monroe, Shame Solutions: How Shame Impacts School-Aged Children 
and What Teachers Can Do To Help, 73 EDUC. F. 58, 62 (2009). 
288 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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constriction, social homogeneity, and state control.289  
Consequently, like the moral-educative mission critique of 
criminal shaming, a commensurate critique of educational 
shaming punishments supports the view that they should be 
abandoned as disciplinary measures as they are violative of the 
pedagogical imperative of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative 
missions.290 
Strip searches do not satisfy the school’s moral-educative 
mission.291  The shame that results from the required and 
nonconsensual exposure of students’ private body parts to adults 
in a disciplinary strip search objectifies children292 and fails to 
teach them about the sanctity of the body and core expectations 
of bodily privacy.293  As Professor William Buss argues, “It would 
be highly desirable if the citizens of the United States who are 
now in school learn to value privacy, learn by the school’s 
example that the society respects it, and learn that the courts 
will protect it from invasion by governmental searches that 
violate fourth amendment principles.”294  However, instead, the 
lesson taught by strip searches is “an erosion of privacy and the 
destruction of human values that go with privacy.”295  The 
education that is imparted by strip search shaming punishments 
 
289 See Amanda H. Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: The Increasing 
Constriction of Constitutional Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235, 
238 (2014) (discussing how the United States Supreme Court’s control discourse, 
which has been capitalized upon by schools in the infliction of student punishments, 
has resulted in the “dramatic curtailment of the scope of student constitutional 
rights”). 
290 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, The Rule of Law and Civic Education, 
67 SMU L. REV. 693, 699 (2014) (“The first American public schools were founded 
with this civic mission in mind, and throughout most of our Nation’s history, civic 
education was prioritized.”). 
291 Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth 
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 943 
(2011) (“In addition to the psychological trauma, a school official’s decision to strip 
search a student conveys a moral message, teaches negative lessons about rights 
and responsibilities, and strongly affects the student’s future relationship with 
teachers and staff.”). 
292 Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F. Supp. 3d 639, 647 (M.D. 
Pa. 2016) (determining that school strip searches objectify students). 
293 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009) 
(finding that a student strip search violated “both subjective and reasonable societal 
expectations of personal privacy”). 
294 William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public 
Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 792 (1974). 
295 Id. 
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is not one of dignity, decency, or any other positive moral value.  
Because the use of strip searches in schools instructs children in 
a way that contravenes the pedagogical mission of educating 
them for participation in a democratic society that values dignity 
and decency, these shaming practices must be eliminated from 
schools.296 
Forced apologies, as an example of an “induced-compliance 
paradigm,” also do not serve the educative mission of schools.297  
They are not an efficacious way to impart positive moral 
positioning for students, as a true mea culpa cannot be forced by 
an intermediary.298  Instead, “moral development and educational 
theory suggest that the only way to effect consistent behavioral 
change is by encouraging autonomous moral reasoning, wherein 
wrongdoers come to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions 
more or less of their own accord . . . .”299  As Professor Brent 
White has explained: 
[I]ndividuals who apologize only when told to are operating at 
Kohlberg’s “pre-conventional level” or Gilligan’s “self-interested 
stage” of moral development, which refer [sic] to the level of 
moral development of an average seven-year-old.  Individuals at 
the pre-conventional or self-interested stage have not developed 
the capacity for moral reasoning based on the importance of 
respecting conventional social norms, honoring higher ethical 
principles, or fulfilling relational responsibilities.  Rather, they 
are simply responding to the threat of punishment or the 
promise of reward without any principled understanding of why 
the authority figure is asking them to behave in a certain way.  





296 See Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really 
Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 921, 943 (1997) (“[S]trip searches of children set[] a curious moral for 
the nation’s youth.”). 
297 White, supra note 234, at 1289. 
298 See Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as 
Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 727 (2008) (“If the emotion of sorrow and 
remorse is the ‘engine’ of apology, then the intervention of third parties or collective 
actors seems somewhat antithetical to the apologetic act (which, typically, calls for 
direct exchanges between the offender and the offended).”). 
299 White, supra note 234, at 1290. 
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refrain from the behavior that precipitated the forced apology as 
long as the threat level was high enough.  As soon as the 
authority figures were out of the picture, however, he might 
revert to the harmful behavior.300 
 What is even more problematic about forced apologies as 
school-shaming punishments is that they are often required in 
response to rights-protected behavior.301  So, even though 
Professor Garvey, who generally disfavors criminal shaming, 
endorses forced apology rituals as meeting the moral education 
theory of criminal punishment, such endorsement is premised 
upon an apology for an established violation of criminal law.302  
In schools, typically, there has been no such establishment of 
clear wrongdoing of this caliber.  By compelling apologies to 
effectuate shaming, school officials are, in fact, acting in direct 
contravention of an education of morality; they are instead 
“vitiating [the] moral force” of an effective apology and 
eliminating ideals of dignity and decency.303  Consequently, 
forced apologies should be eliminated from schools’ disciplinary 
repertoires as they clash with the moral-educative mission of K-
12 schools. 
Additionally, dress code shaming punishments undermine 
the pedagogical goal of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative 
mission.  As determined by Professor Harbach, “The 
consequences of being ‘dress coded’ have a negative impact on 
student learning and participation [with] . . . studies suggest[ing] 
that a preoccupation with physical appearance based on 
sexualized norms disrupts mental capacity and cognitive 
 
300 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
301 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A Framework for 
Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825, 826 (2009) 
(“[P]rotecting freedom of speech advances a core goal of school education: teaching 
students about the Constitution and their rights. At the very least, there is 
dissonance, if not hypocrisy, in teaching students that free speech matters when 
school officials themselves provide virtually no protection for student speech.”). 
302 See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 792–93 (discussing how 
forced apologies can educate where there has been an unjustifiable violation and 
established wrongdoing). 
303 NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND 
RECONCILIATION 49 (1991) (“[A]n authentic apology cannot be delegated, consigned, 
exacted, or assumed by the principals, no less outsiders, without totally altering its 
meaning and vitiating its moral force.”). 
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function.”304  Although all student learning is impacted by these 
types of punishment and culture, dress code sanctions are 
disproportionally meted out on girls, and with perhaps even more 
force on girls of color,305 which results in missed instructional 
time while being shamed and a lesson of indignity and indecency 
for the witnessing community of schoolchildren.306  These 
“[u]nequal results are unfair, and unfair procedures lead to 
inequality,”307 which expressly conflicts with the pedagogical goal 
to offer equal education to all public school students.308  
Consequently, because these dress code shaming punishments 
take away from the moral-educative mission of schools, they 
should no longer be inflicted upon students. 
Finally, restroom access denials that bar transgender 
students from using the restroom that conforms with their 
gender identity or that require transgender students to use a 
restroom that is not used by other students damage the 
pedagogical goal of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative mission.309  
Although transgender youth are entitled to “non-disciplinary and 
protected spaces in education,”310 students who are punished by 
 
304 Harbach, supra note 243, at 1043–44 (citing AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, APA 
TASK FORCE ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON 
THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS 21 (2007), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/girl 
s/report-full.pdf). 
305 See Ariel G. Siner, Comment, Dressing to Impress? A Legal Examination of 
Dress Codes in Public Schools, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 259, 260 (2017) (warning 
that school dress codes perpetuate “archaic sexist standards”); MONIQUE W. MORRIS, 
PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS 184–85 (2016) 
(discussing how dress code discipline often disproportionally targets African 
American girls in schools). 
306 See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1057 (outlining the missed learning 
opportunities that result from school dress code shaming punishments and how 
these disciplinary punishments are unequally inflicted on girls). 
307 Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1992). 
308 See Maurice R. Dyson, Promise Zones, Poverty, and the Future of Public 
Schools: Confronting the Challenges of Socioeconomic Integration & School Culture 
in High-Poverty Schools, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 711, 733 (arguing school-shaming 
punishments “reinforce a ‘badge of inferiority’ that was at the crux of the Brown v. 
Board of Education rationale in striking down segregation in public schools”). 
309 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, 
and Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEV. L.J. 774, 790 (2006) (discussing the lessons 
of indignity and indecency that are taught by transgender student restroom access 
denials). 
310 Neo Khuu, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest 
Convergence, and the Future of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 184, 192 n.40 
(2017). 
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restroom access denials no longer have safe spaces for basic 
human needs.311  Consequently, these students tend to withdraw 
from the school community and miss valuable learning 
opportunities,312 hampering their attainment of current and 
future successes.313  By stigmatizing children with these 
mandates, schools and their employees are educating the school 
community that discrimination and ostracism based on gender 
are acceptable.314  By engaging in restroom access denials, 
schools are instructing cisgender students that anyone who is not 
like them does not deserve basic rights of dignity, decency, or 
legal protection.315  Such pernicious and detrimental pedagogy 
erodes the basic moral-educative mission of public schools.316  
Consequently, these restroom shaming mandates should no 
longer be inflicted upon students. 
 
311 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 201, 202 (2012) (discussing how the denial of basic bodily needs by civil 
rights reform opponents is “a potent tool for preserving existing arrangements of 
status and power”). 
312 See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom 
Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 137 (2010) (identifying restroom 
discrimination as one of the leading causes of transgender students dropping out of 
school). 
313 See MINOW, supra note 255, at 27 (“[W]hen their identities are devalued in 
the society, children know it, and that message damages their self-esteem and 
ability to succeed.”). 
314 See Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 294 (W.D. Pa. 
2017) (noting in its finding of irreparable harm when transgender students are 
barred access to gender-identity restrooms that “[c]ourts have long recognized that 
disparate treatment itself stigmatizes members of a disfavored group as innately 
inferior, and raises the ‘inevitable inference’ of animosity toward those impacted by 
the involved classification”) (citation omitted); Aaron J. Curtis, Conformity or 
Nonconformity? Designing Legal Remedies To Protect Transgender Students from 
Discrimination, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 459, 473 (2016) (analyzing how transgender 
student restroom access denials “might result in increased stigma and lead 
transgender students to be further ostracized by the cisgender majority”). 
315 See Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does 
Airport Scanning Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1303 (2013) (citing Wolff, 
supra note 311, at 231) (“Tobias Wolff argues that invoking a sense of shame and 
bodily anxiety due to bodily differences has served as a rhetorical weapon by those 
objecting to granting civil rights to discriminated groups such as blacks, gays, or 
transgender people.”). 
316 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) 
(“Consciously or otherwise, teachers . . . demonstrate the appropriate form of civil 
discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class.”). 
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The examination of these school-shaming punishments 
affirmatively gives rise to the same moral-educative concerns in 
the critique of criminal shaming punishments.317  School shaming 
fails to provide an appropriate, positive moral education of the 
punished individual,318 which was at the core of Professor 
Garvey’s opposition to criminal shaming.319  As even recognized 
by Professor Kahan in his touchstone article on shaming, these 
punishments do not guarantee an educative impact.320  In the K-
12 school context, shaming sanctions are inefficacious, “resulting 
in significantly unequal punishment and inefficient deterrence”321 
and teaching nothing of positive moral value, which contravenes 
the core pedagogical value of a moral-educative mission of public 
schools.322 
School shaming also provides no positive moral education of 
the surrounding community.323  Instead, these educational 
punishments teach rights constriction, which was articulated as 
an argument against criminal law shaming sanctions by 
Professor Schulhofer.324  When schools inflict shaming, they are 
not abiding by their moral obligation “to ‘teach by example’ by 
avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional 
protections.”325  This aspect of harmful state control,326 along with 
 
317 See supra notes 137–152 and accompanying text. 
318 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 127, at 20–21 (discussing the lack of educative 
effect of shaming). 
319 See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text; see also Rosenblatt, supra 
note 22, at 17 (arguing criminal shaming’s popularity “waned in the nineteenth 
century, likely due in part to the influence of the Quakers—who advocated for 
rehabilitative and educative punishment”). 
320 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 636 (noting that not all 
punished individuals will view their conduct as equally shameful as the punisher). 
321 Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its 
Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 649 (2004). 
322 See Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 243, 270–71 (2011) (arguing public schools should “treat[] and engage[] people 
as moral agents”). 
323 See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings 
Analysis to Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 
497, 521 (2013) (discussing how shaming teaches the community to isolate and 
stigmatize the punished individual). 
324 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 236–37. 
325 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 855 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
326 See Justin R. Chapa, Comment, Stripped of Meaning: The Supreme Court 
and the Government as Educator, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 127, 168 (describing 
school dress codes as a form of highly-restrictive social control). 
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a focus on social homogeneity,327 is conveyed with each 
administration of school shaming—issues identified by Professor 
Nussbaum as reasons for the invalidation of criminal shaming.328  
These concerns are even more problematic in K-12 schools, given 
that the school disciplinary process is not “a totally accurate, 
unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair,” which was 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Goss v. 
Lopez.329  Also, the use of shaming against targeted minority or 
other marginalized students instructs the greater school 
community that it is normal and appropriate to discriminate 
against and stigmatize students based on these differences.330  
This contravenes the obligations of schools to convey civic 
education to prepare students to participate in a liberal 
democracy of diverse citizens.331 
In sum, school-shaming punishments do not teach lessons of 
dignity, decency, or any other positive civic values,332 which are 
core components of the moral-educative mission of American 
public schools.333  This lack of moral-educative efficacy was a 
 
327 See Gustafson, supra note 54, at 344 (discussing the centrifugal effects of 
shaming, as it pushes already marginalized individuals “farther to the margins”). 
328 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232. 
329 419 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1975) (noting that “[d]isciplinarians, although 
proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice of others; 
and the controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge are often 
disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if 
that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational 
process”). 
330 See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch a Child: Bullying and Gender 
Nonconformity in Our Nation’s Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827, 847 (2011) (discussing 
educators’ complicity in the bullying of gender nonconforming students by their 
peers based on their discriminatory treatment of those students). 
331 See Ronald C. Den Otter, Can a Liberal Take His Own Side in an Argument? 
The Case for John Rawls’s Idea of Political Liberalism, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 319, 344 
(2005) (“Any conception of civic education, which would be appropriate for a morally 
pluralistic society such as our own, would have to strike a more appropriate balance 
between tolerance for different ways of life and cultivation of the skills and virtues 
that make good citizenship possible in a liberal democracy.”); Martha Minow, After 
Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 640 
(2008) (discussing the important roles schools play in conveying civic values to 
prepare students for “self-governance in a diverse society”). 
332 See Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions 
and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
929, 954 (2003) (arguing that shaming demonstrates “that the world is very, very 
unsafe”). 
333 See Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of Publicly Outing Private People, 73 
OR. L. REV. 159, 219 (1994) (“Virtually every school of morality embraces the 
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central part of the opposition of Professors Markel and Massaro 
to the use of shaming in the criminal justice system.334  
Consequently, like the scholarly rejection of criminal shaming 
punishments on the basis of their failure to fulfill a moral-
educative mission, educational shaming punishments should be 
rejected as they fail to meet the key pedagogical goal of moral 
education in American schools. 
School discipline “must work to support the educational 
mission of the school.”335  However, shaming does scant to 
educate.336  The humiliation of shaming young children is not “a 
sound means of” inculcating social norms or preparing students 
to participate in a society that values dignity and decency.337  
Egalitarianism is certainly being abandoned by school-shaming 
punishments as they tend to target the most vulnerable and 
marginalized groups in schools—students of color, female 
students, effeminate male students, and transgender students.338  
Instead, as Professor Markel argued, “The liberal way of life 
requires an education of citizens that appreciates the importance 
and order of individual freedom, moral responsibility, and respect 
for the procedures that guarantee a well-ordered polity.”339  In 
order to fulfill this moral-educative mission, schools must teach 






principle that all people should be accorded equal dignity . . . .”); E. Gary Spitko, A 
Reform Agenda Premised upon the Reciprocal Relationship Between Anti-LGBT Bias 
in Role Model Occupations and the Bullying of LGBT Youth, 48 CONN. L. REV. 71, 77 
(2015) (discussing teachers’ role-modeling function in the instillation of core societal 
values in school children). 
334 See Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1884. 
335 Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 288. 
336 See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 784 (discussing the 
lack of educative effect of shaming). 
337 Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1930. 
338 See Whitman, supra note 96, at 1064 (arguing shaming sanctions are 
“inflicted only on certain, peculiarly vulnerable classes” of people). 
339 Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2226. 
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recognition of rights.340  This will require a termination of school-
shaming punishments, as they are antithetical in every way to a 
virtuous, moral education.341 
4. Conclusion 
Shaming punishments should no longer be implemented in 
schools, just as they should no longer be implemented in criminal 
law, as they violate principles of dignity, decency, and core civic 
value education.  School “shaming punishments communicate 
brashly and unequivocally [with] . . . clear meaning and visible 
bite.”342  This clear meaning of these shaming punishments does 
not jibe with the pedagogical and moral aims of the American 
educational system.343  Consequently, school-shaming 
punishments should be rejected based on the same theoretical 




340 See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM xi 
(1999) (discussing how these virtues “do not arise spontaneously but require 
education and cultivation”); Kevin J. Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant 
Leap for Group Rights: Accommodating the Associational Role of “Intimate” 
Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REV. 595, 614 (1993) (“[P]ublic schools can and 
ought to teach the values of civic virtue . . . .”). 
341 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (stating 
schools have the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility”); New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would be 
incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students 
with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same 
time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional 
protections.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (stating the objective of 
public education is the “inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system”). 
342 Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 948–49 (2006). 
343 Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of Educational 
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 217 (2005) (“[T]he 
fundamental goal of elementary and secondary education is to prepare children to be 
good citizens, which includes instilling civic values and developing strong social 
skills.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
If “[t]he law’s objective is to deter as much harm as possible 
while imposing the fewest costs,”344 and shaming in legal contexts 
is only of utility when the benefits outweigh the costs,345 then 
shaming is certainly not an appropriate mechanism to punish 
schoolchildren for the violation—or suspected violation—of school 
rules, policies, and norms.  The harm is too great; the costs are 
too high; and the benefit is nil.  Shaming’s dissonance with the 
pedagogical aims of the school environment should end its use in 
K-12 schools.346  Educators should reject such disciplinary 
methods, as applied to predominantly minor schoolchildren in a 
tutelary environment, under a philosophical lens, just as 
preeminent scholars have rejected shaming sanctions for adults 
in the criminal justice system.347  School shaming runs counter to 
dignity, decency, and schools’ institutional, moral-educative 
mission, which demonstrates how it is not reflective of the 
“think” perspective of “a set of techniques aimed at fostering the 
best conditions for arriving at collective societal preference.”348  
Therefore, shaming punishments must be abandoned as a school 
disciplinary method, because they clash with the core 
pedagogical and moral aims of American public education.349 
Compared to criminal shaming, the rejection of these 
sanctions is easier in the school context, as they do not require 
their exchange for the equally harmful measures of exclusionary 
 
344 Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: 
An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 
284 (2014). 
345 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and 
Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1618 (2000). 
346 See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ 
Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 
398 (2013) (“If schools do not honor students’ constitutional rights, schools cannot 
effectively teach students about those rights.”). 
347 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text; see also NUSSBAUM, supra 
note 43, at 230. 
348 Ryan Calo, Essay, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 798 n.168 
(2014) (citing PETER JOHN ET AL., NUDGE, NUDGE, THINK, THINK: EXPERIMENTING 
WITH WAYS TO CHANGE CIVIC BEHAVIOUR 13–14 (2011)). 
349 See Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science 
Evidence in Parents Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and 
Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703, 729 (2008) (discussing schools’ “unique 
mission of preparing students for the duties of citizenship in our diverse, pluralistic 
nation”). 
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or corporal punishment.350  In K-12 schools, there is “an 
expressively viable alternative sanction,”351 in the form of 
disciplinary measures that incorporate positive behavioral 
strategies.  School discipline can and should incorporate the basic 
tenets of dignity, decency, and moral-educative mission.352  These 
are all steps in the right direction to achieve the aim of “a well-
educated citizenry.”353  Therefore, shaming should also be 
rejected in the K-12 school environment under any of the 
philosophical critiques of criminal shaming354—dignity, decency, 
and a moral-educative mission—which all shape the core 
pedagogical foundation of American education.355 
 
350 See, e.g., Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 760 (“If the 
alternative to [criminal] shame is imprisonment, then at worst, shame simply 
substitutes one set of indignities for another.”); Whitman, supra note 96, at 1058 
(discussing how shaming punishments are no crueler than incarceration). 
351 Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2080 (noting how the rejection 
of criminal shaming “would result in the certainty of the even greater evils of 
imprisonment: the default punishment in the absence of an expressively viable 
alternative sanction”). 
352 See Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 277 (arguing for “a new approach 
to school discipline based on the constitutional value of human dignity”). 
353 Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (“[A] 
strong educational system is essential in preparing our children to meet the 
demands of an increasingly sophisticated world, and in enabling them to be 
productive, responsible and thoughtful citizens who may in turn contribute to the 
community in which they live.”). 
354 See Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The 
Argument from Moral Burdens, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2645 (2007) (discussing 
how shaming punishment theory exemplifies that these sanctions are “not merely 
theoretical”). 
355 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (defining the U.S. public school 
system as “a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 79 (1979) (discussing how schools 
teach students “citizen’s social responsibilities” which is “crucial to the continued 
good health of a democracy”). 
